Ingratitude

Premier Edouard Herriot arrived in the capital from triumphant visits to Britain and Belgium and found a cold, critical Parliament awaiting him. The lack of warm welcome was not in keeping with the effervescent exuberance displayed in many lands at the TIME of the issuance of the Chequers communique (TIME, June 30).

The Senate was categoric in its questioning. It wanted to know:

1) Was the Experts' Plan accepted without reserve by all the Allies, would it be put in operation without retouching?

2) Was it correct that the Ruhr would be evacuated only in proportion to payments made, what precautions would be taken for its reoccupation

3) Was any change of program envisaged as to occupation of the left bank of the Rhine?

4) Was France committed to support the admission of Germany to the League of Nations ?

5) Was Belgium in accord with France on the questions of reparations, of disarmament of Germany and of the latter's admission to the League ?

6) Had Italy been informed of what was being done?

7) How was German disarmament to be accomplished, what would be done if Germany paid no attention to the MacDonald-Herriot note?

8) Where and when would the interallied conference be held, which nations would be invited ?

9) Was England ready to make concessions in exchange for French sacrifices, particularly with regard to the French debt, and what was considered likely to be the eventual attitude of the United States in this matter ?

10) Had any formal agreements been made in London and Brussels ?

To this questionnaire Premier Herriot wrote a reply which he read to both Houses of Parliament and which was received by them without enthusiasm:

Chequers. "I went to Chequers at the cordial invitation of the British

Prime Minister to discuss with him the necessary arrangements for putting into operation the Experts' Plan. This plan had been ratified by the Reparations Commission and accepted by the preceding Government. I confirmed this acceptance."

Commercial Security. "It is very evident that the interests of the Allies, and especially those of France, demand above all that organization of the service to be created for administration of the guarantees should be assured by conditions which will give all security. The Allies must secure the commercial value of their claims on Germany. We cannot have a recurrence of the disillusion which followed the former establishment of a schedule of payments."

Ruhr. "As for the military occupation of the Ruhr, while the British Government has expressed its desire to see a return to invisible occupation after economic evacuation, there cannot be, for one moment, any question of abandonment of their liberty of decision by the French and the Belgian Governments."

Political Guarantee. "It was necessary to consider the possibility of Germany's failing to carry out the extremely reasonable payments imposed by the Dawes Report. With a loyalty for which I thank him, Mr. MacDonald renewed to me the assurance, which he had given to MM. Theunis and Hymans and which was asked for in a letter by M. Poincare, that in case Germany failed to fulfill her obligations as laid down by the experts, who had acted in all independence and impartiality, Great Britain, like France, the guardian of contracts, would engage herself solemnly to side with the Allies. Without this political guarantee foreseen by the report itself, it is too evident that purely technical guarantees might become inoperative as the result of the least incident."

German Disarmament. "For the defense of the French and Belgian troops in the present occupied districts, certain precautions are essential and Mr. MacDonald has consented to an inquiry by military experts into the measures to be taken. If Europe is to have peace, Germany must be disarmed. Neither declarations nor promises are sufficient, and on this subject, I am convinced that Mr. MacDonald is as resolute as we and that his intentions are not less vigorous than ours."

Brussels. "I have this to say, that in Brussels at no moment and on no subject was there the least difficulty."

The U. S. "I would express the hope that the United States will associate itself not only in this conference, but in all the efforts we are going to make for the establishment of peace." (Restrained applause).

Interallied Debts. "With the grave problem of definite security for France, interallied debts will be the subject of further conversations which we have mutually undertaken to continue. With all the strength of which I am capable, I insisted and I will insist on the unfavorable situation in which France will find herself even after execution of the Dawes plan if she does not obtain a just settlement of this matter."

Germany. "We have shown that if Germany is loyal, she will have nothing to fear. If she is not loyal, she will not be spared." A few days later the Socialists became impatient. Premier Herriot, himself a Socialist, asked for 205,000,000 francs appropriation for continuing the occupation of the Ruhr. The Socialists thought France should quit the Ruhr forthwith, but the Premier put both feet down, took up a not unaggressive stand and said "No!" The Opposition thereupon warmed up and in a body supported the Premier. Twenty-six Communists, who always vote against everything, did the expected. Ninety-four Socialists, peeved at the Right and Centre for supporting the Socialist leader, decided not to vote. Premier Herriot was upheld by 456 votes against 26.