On Canada

Two voices, quite different, quite typical, spoke, last week, in England.

Canadian Voice. The Vice Chancellor of Oxford University sat attentively in a reserved seat, surrounded by the more or less hoary Doctors, Proctors and Heads of Houses. Supported in the rear by a begowned mass of the lesser learned, Sir Robert Falconer, President of Toronto University, delivered a professorial lecture.

His address was on Canada and her nationalist spirit, was delivered under the title: The United States as a Neighbor. He voiced the attitude of his country, often taken for granted or ignored in the U.S., the attitude of a nation conscious that it has grown to its majority:

"Today the United States does not stand on these Americas as the leader of young nations who look to her for protection against Europe. It is doubtful if the Latin Republics of the Southern Hemisphere would willingly accept her as a protector-ess. . . .

"Over against the United States now stands in friendly intercourse the Britannic Commonwealth with rapidly developing members on these American continents -Canada, the British West Indies and British Guiana. . . .

"If a dispute were to arise with one of the Caribbean republics of such proportions as to demand the intervention of Britain as the head of the Commonwealth of Nations, would the United States step in and assert her sole right to settle it? This was what she did in the Venezuelan matter.* In the future, Canada might have a very great interest in the solution. Foreign policy is rapidly becoming an affair not of Britain alone, but of the Britannic Commonwealth.

"Insofar as the Monroe Doctrine refers to Brazil, the Argentine, Chile and Peru, Canada would probably stand aside. It is the future of the West Indies that concerns her. If it should ever happen that any of the islands now owned by other European nations should become salable, the Canadian might find his own interest leading him to urge Britain to purchase it, and he might be unwilling to admit that the Monroe Doctrine should be invoked to prevent the acquisition.

"All this leads up to another position which has been prepared for but not yet occupied-the appointment of a Canadian representative at Washington."

British Voice. Characteristically different was the attitude of an Englishman, an attitude not infrequently expressed in England of late. An unnamed correspondent, writing for the Spectator, London weekly owned by J. St. Loe Strachey, declared:

"Powerful forces -premeditated and unpremeditated-are at work for a union of the two great nations of the American continent. United States capital isn't the least of these factors. More than -L-500,000,000 of American money now is invested in the Dominion; and it is expected that, before 1925 is out, another -L-100,000,000 may be added. . . .

"Pan-Americanism, too, is busy. Its elaborate organization in Washington seldom sleeps. It has no direct connection with the American Government, yet American politicians wink at operations of the Pan-American Bureau within a stone's throw of the Capitol. . . .

"They [Canadians] know perfectly well that if they wanted to be independent or to join the United States, they would only have to say so.

"Canada is always clamoring for more British settlers. ... A quarter of a million British immigrants per annum for the next 50 years would make the Dominion so solidly British that annexation sentiment would have little chance to develop. ..."

*In 1895, Great Britain and Venezuela disputed the boundary separating British Guiana from Venezuela. Great Britain declined the U.S. suggestion of arbitration and interpreted the Monroe Doctrine in a way which President Cleveland refused to accept. The U.S. named a commission to settle the dispute, prepared to support Venezuela in the possession of what should be ascertained to be her rightful territory. Great Britain tactfully accepted arbitration and, in 1899, was awarded most of the territory in dispute.