Monday, Aug. 31, 1925

Historic Conference?

The Peking Government issued formal invitations. They were layed down by her diplomats in the foreign offices of Great Britain, France, Italy, Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Japan and the U. S. They requested the honor of the presence of representatives of those governments in Peking on Oct. 26, at customs conference in accordance with the nine power treaties recently ratified (TIME, Aug. 17). The conference promises to be a milestone in the history of modern China.

The Agenda. The purpose of the conference will be to make new regulations for control of Chinese customs duties. These tariffs have been collected under the supervision of foreign powers ever since the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 when the powers wished to secure the payment of their indemnities. The maximum tariff is 5%. The Chinese wish to increase it. They propose an increase of 2%% with the restoration of "customs autonomy"--the withdrawal of foreign supervision over tariff collection. Failing the latter, they are expected to press for an increase of 7 1/2% bringing the maximum duties up to 12 1/2% in order that the likin or local provincial taxes may be abolished.

The Situation. The problem of the conference will be much more than the economic question of determining what tariff is fair and equable. It involves the entire situation in China. China is a bundle of conflicting forces none of which is dominant. In the first place there is the Peking Government, nominally ruling the country but actually hardly more than painted drop screen in front of affairs. The Peking Government is extraordinarily weak. In South China its power is purely nominal. The great body of the people, 95% or more is illiterate and grossly ignorant, some 1,000,000 of its 325,000,000 population are under arms in the control of the several tuchuns (war lords) with conflicting ambitions. In the country there is a strong anti-foreign sentiment which in the south has been encouraged by the Bolsheviks, although the Chinese are too ignorant as a body for communism to mean anything to them. Then there are the foreign colonies and footholds of the powers, and their diplomatic representatives.

The only matter in which the Chinese are even slightly united is in the spirit of anti-foreignism. The only way in which any government can hope to weld the country behind it so that it can really rule, is by catering to that sentiment. Any government that attempts to oppose it is ministering to its own downfall. Consequently the Government in issuing invitations to the customs conference wanted to have customs automony discussed with a view to throwing out foreign control of tariff collection--or, if that is unobtainable, to secure such high duties as will strengthen it by increasing its revenue and enabling it to reduce internal taxes. If the Chinese can induce the conference to make preparations for the abolition of extraterritoriality (special privileges for foreigners resident in China) -- that would be another feather in its cap.

Vicious Circle. The U. S. is perhaps most willing of all the Powers to meet th& Chinese with concessions. But the trouble is that the general attitude of the Powers is that a stable government well disposed and able to protect foreigners, their property and concessions must be established before they will give up their special rights and privileges under present treaties. Yet, the condition is such, according to most observers, that the prospect of developing a stable and powerful government because of increasing anti-foreign sentiment lies only in that government's securing the abrogation of those special treaty privileges.

The Significance. The importance of the forthcoming conference lies in what attitude the powers are prepared to take. If they are prepared to make concessions the way may be open to a gradual amelioration of the present tense and fruitless state of affairs. On the other hand it will lay their nationals and their interests open to suffering and trespass if not destruction by the anti-foreign sentiment abroad in China. If the powers stand strictly by their treaty rights they may so weaken the Government on which they depend for guarantee of those rights, that they may within a few months or years be faced with the alternative of using force or losing their foothold in the country. In that case Soviet Russia would be ready to step into their place, posing as the friend of China. The course of Chinese diplomacy at the coming conference will lie between Scylla and Charybdis.

The Negotiators. The Chinese negotiators at the conference will be C. T. Wang and W. W. Yen and they differ between themselves as to the course they should pursue. Both are for customs autonomy, but Wang wants it abruptly and Yen wants it gradually. They represent a more and less radical attitude, but there are elements more radical than either of them who are demanding customs autonomy and abolition of extraterritoriality at a stroke and no shilly-shallying with the powers.

The U. S. representatives will be Minister MacMurray and Silas Strawn, famed Chicago lawyer, who was once very nearly appointed Attorney General by President Coolidge. On these two will rest the greatest burden of steering a middle course. For they will have U. S. citizens to protect, and the facts of the Chinese situation to face as well as the demands of the powers who would like a great number of desirable things which probably are not obtainable.