Disarmament

Delegates representing all the Great Powers, except Russia, and most of the potent minor nations, met at Geneva last week, forming an assembly whose 22-word title sketched its purpose: The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, being a Commission to prepare for a Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

Can the nations be got together at the Disarmament Conference itself with sufficient chance of success to make worth while its being held at all?

The very word "disarmament" has no meaning for purposes of international negotiation until defined. Does it mean, as "French logic" demands, that in order to "disarm" a nation you must do something about "peaceful dye factories" capable of being converted to produce poison gas in a few hours? Does it mean, as "British common sense" insists, that "practically" it is not possible to "disarm" a nation further than by scrapping its submarines, airplanes, guns?

These two opposing views, as everyone knows, were presented with the greatest energy by M. Paul-Boncour (France) and Viscount Cecil (Britain) when the Council of the League deliberated upon these questions and many another (TIME, Dec. 21). As a result, it was considered imperative that vital if quite academic preparations should be made before the Disarmament Conference itself should be convoked -- if ever. The press of the world has unfortunately given the impression by its headlines that "disarming" is to be attempted at this preliminary and purely preparatory conference. Such is not the case.

Agenda. The Preparatory Commission will simply endeavor to find answers to seven broad questions :

I. What is to be understood by the term "armaments"?

a) Definition of related terms.

II. a) Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, or must any measures of disarmament be confined to peace strength?

b) What is to be understood by the expression "reduction and limitation of armaments"?

III. By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another; that is, numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditures, etc.?

IV. Can there be said to be "offensive" and "defensive" armaments ?

a) Can it be ascertained whether a given force is "defensive" or contrarily "offensive"?

V. On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries?

VI. Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament?

a) If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?

VII. Admitting that disarmament depends upon security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament practical unless it is general ?

Significance. A glance at these questions reveals that man knows less of making peace than anything else. The merest numskull can shout a war cry, fire a blunderbuss. The language of peace, seldom heard, must be studied and conned over before disarmament can even be discussed.

Present Strength. The nations have at their disposal the following indisputable subjects of disarmament:

Fighters. ("Regular Army") : France -- 733,707; Russia -- 562,967; Great Britain -- 520,948 ; Italy--308,000; Japan-- 235,056; The U. S. 136,560; Germany-- 99,086.

Warboats. Significant facts: 1) The U. S. possesses more submarines than any other power: 118.

2) The U. S. possesses no "battle cruisers" (superdreadnaughts with almost destroyer speed) while Britain and Japan have four each.

3) The famed "5-5-3" naval ratio among the U. S., Britain and Japan holds good for capital ships only. Should capital ships be abolished (as Britain desires) the ratio would become 1 1/5-5-2 1/2 (i. e., Britain would be four times as strong as the U. S., twice as strong as Japan).

Since the U. S. is strong in submarines and capital ships and weak in cruisers of all classes, the scrapping of submarines and capital ships -- now widely mooted --would greatly weaken the position of the U. S. from a naval point of view.

Costs. The appalling increase in cost of wars may be judged from the fact that the U. S. Government spent as much during every four days of our participation in the World War as it spent in fighting the entire Revolutionary War ($105,000,000). Though the U. S. actually participated in the World War for but 19 months, its loss in men was 120,136. The Allies lost 5,146,251 men, the Central Powers 3,386,200. The World War grand total of killed and wounded was in excess of 46 million men. (There are now 27 million adult males in the U. S.)

Leaders. Since the Conference is to be concerned chiefly with hard work, the delegates are nearly all seasoned diplomats with a lifetime of experience in international dealings. The U. S. delegate, Mr. Hugh Simpson Gibson, began his diplomatic career as a secretary to the U. S. legation at Tegucigalpa in 1908. He progressed steadily through increasingly responsible posts at Honduras, Havana, Santo Domingo, Brussels, London and Paris, until he was appointed U. S. Minister to Poland (1919-24) and finally to Switzerland, his present post. Paradoxically, the German delegate is Count von Bernstorff, famed as the pre-war German Ambassador to the U. S.