Parley Fails

What probable effect will be produced upon the world by the total breakdown in Geneva last week of the U. S.-British-Japanese Naval Limitations Parley? Which government was chiefly to blame? Were precautions neglected at the start, which, if taken, might have greatly fostered success?

To answer these questions fairly and convincingly became last week a game of wits, which aggressive and argumentative persons lost no time in playing with one another.

Precautions? When U. S. President Calvin Coolidge issued invitations to the Parley (TIME, Feb. 21), he stressed an intent to extend the 5-5-3 Washington Treaty ratio to cover not only capital ships (as at present) but auxiliary craft as well. Mere "extension" seemed not to call for the same amount of preliminary sounding out which would have been advisable had a wholly new problem been up for consideration. Thus President Coolidge is reputed to have entered the affair with no more than routine caution.

The British Government of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin unquestionably took note of the fact that President Coolidge went on with preparations for the Parley even after his invitations to France and Italy had been refused (TIME, March 7). This and other facts bolstered up a British theory that President Coolidge wanted a "European diplomatic victory" for use in campaigning for re-election and might be prepared to yield a good deal to get it. Thus the British Government reputedly did not sound out the U. S. Administration quite so thoroughly as would have been wise had they expected strong resistance to their demands.

These omissions of precaution may seem purely negative: but a basic and positive error was committed when the U. S. and British delegations were given their instructions in different units of measure. The U. S. Administration formulated its instructions in terms of "tons" or "total tonnage"; whereas the British Government stated its demands in terms of "individual ships" or "numbers of ships." The ensuing and inevitable confusion was as much to be expected as though the Parley had been about "fruit," with one antagonist able to speak only in "bushels" and the other instructed solely in terms of "kinds of peaches" or "numbers of cherries."

From the first, the Japanese delegation saw the futility of discussion under such circumstances; and Admiral Viscount Minoru Saito, Chief Japanese Delegate, accordingly did little more throughout the Parley than to make well-meant efforts to draw the U. S. and British delegations together on some common ground (for example, his idea of a "naval holiday" during which no more ships would be built by any power).

Who Most To Blame? Chief U. S. Delegate Hugh Simons Gibson and Chief British Delegate the Rt. Hon. William Clive Bridgeman each maintained to the bitter end last week,-that the plan of his own delegations was of the two:

1) the most economical in taxpayer's money, 2) the least threatening to the peace of the world.

Since one ,or the other Chief Delegate must have been in error, observers who sought to be impartial had to set up some arbitrary standards by which to judge.

If then, it be admitted that by "most economical" is meant that plan which will cost U. S. and British taxpayers the least total sum, the U. S. proposals seemed to fulfill that claim. They consistently envisioned both a smaller number of ships and a lower total tonnage than the British proposals.

In order to claim that their plan was really the more economical, the British trailed a red herring across the issue as follows. They stated the obvious fact that a small ship costs less than a large one, and then pointed out that their plan called for many ships individually smaller than those proposed by the U. S. delegation. Thus the British said in effect: "We want cherries and you want peaches. A cherry costs less than a peach, and therefore our plan is the cheaper."

The British thereupon carefully ignored the fact that they were asking for so very many more "cherries" (small ships) than the U. S. with its "peaches" (large ships) and that the total cost of the British plan was much the greater.

To take up the second major claim of each Chief Delegate, namely, that the plan of his delegation would involve the lesser armed threat to the peace of the world, additional standards of judgment must be set up.

If it be admitted that the navy with the heaviest "battle strength" is the "most threatening," then the U. S. claim for a large number of relatively large ships may fairly be called the more threatening

On the other hand, if it be postulated that the navy with the greatest "sea patrol strength" in small fast ships is the "most threatening," then the British plan may be adjudged the more threatening of the two.

On this point, everything is determined by what standard of judgment is first accepted, and either standard may be fairly and plausibly argued for.

Thus, all who played the "Naval Limitations Game" (see above); last week found magnificent scope here for their talents. Many who tried to argue the issue agreed with a statement made by the chief British naval expert, Admiral Earl Jellicoe. Said he, at Geneva, after the Parley had adjourned: "It should never have been held! The result is most unfortunate for. everybody."

Probable Effect? Nearly all observers agreed in thinking that the U. S. public has been jolted by the Parley in two of its long-cherished beliefs:

1) that the U. S. is approximately equal in naval strength to Britain (whereas the airing of statistics at Geneva has proved Britain's long lead);

2) the belief that even if the U. S. chooses to remain weak in naval strength, Great Britain will not take advantage of this chance.

Unquestionably, the ill-will generated at Geneva during the last six weeks has made Britain seem far more the "enemy" in U. S. eyes than at any time within the present century. That this new ill-feeling is reciprocated by Britons was to be inferred last week from a savage editorial attack on the U. S. delegation by the usually urbane London Times.

When the U. S. Congress assembles, observers thought, there is sure to be a far greater outcry than usual for a "big navy" from Congressmen representing steel and manufacturing areas. The British side of this sorry picture was shown in Canada last week when Prime Minister Baldwin (see COMMONWEALTH) remarked with his usual devastating candor that one of the hardest things about achieving disarmament would be that it would throw so many honest English armorplate makers out of work.

Last Moments. The Parley ended uneventfully last week as Mr. Gibson, the Chairman, rapped sharply with his gavel and remarked:

"It now remains for me to declare the conference adjourned."

Prior to this declaration, the chief delegates had restated their original contentions at length. They then adopted a joint resolution which expressed the hope that a treaty can be negotiated and adopted at some future date.

The last desultory moments of the Parley were enlivened by British Chief Delegate Bridgeman who somewhat humorously apologized for his own "quick temper" in debate and complimented U. S. Chief Delegate Gibson on his "good temper."