Bombshells & Concessions

It was President Herbert Hoover of the U. S. who opened the statesmen's chess game at Geneva, last week, by advancing a sprightly pawn, Hugh Simons Gibson, U. S. Ambassador to Belgium. The civilized world attended while dapper Mr. Gibson addressed the League of Nations Preparatory Disarmament Commission as follows: "It has recently been my privilege to discuss the general problem of disarmament at considerable length with President Hoover. I am in a position to realize, perhaps as well as anyone, how earnestly he feels that the pact for the renunciation of war opens for us an unprecedented opportunity for advancing the cause of disarmament, an opportunity which admits of no postponement!"

Four Hoover Points. The keynotes of the speech were:

1) The goal of the Disarmament Con ference must be not limitation of arma ments at existing strength but their re duction.

2) Before attempting anything else the Commission should create and agree upon a system or formula for measuring in mathematical units the combative strength of any vessel. Hitherto a different "measuring stick" has been used by almost every navy, and in consequence their experts have really not spoken a common statistical language;

3) Against the thesis of the British Admiralty that a nation's requirements for defense are absolute (specifically in the instance of light cruisers), Herbert Hoover maintains, as did Calvin Coolidge. that they are relative. Thus the British have insisted that they need a certain number of light cruisers, irrespective of how many or how few are possessed by other nations; but it remains the U. S. contention that more or less of these ships are required by a given country, in proportion as the number of prospective enemy ships is great or small.

4) The idea of a French statesman, M. Joseph Paul-Boncour, was approved by Mr. Hoover as suggestive of a means of compromise between Great Britain and the U. S. in the cruiser dispute. Briefly this idea as unfolded to the Committee last year is that under a disarmament pact giving Great Britain the right to build a certain tonnage of destroyers, she might transfer a portion of this allowance out of the destroyer class and build cruisers under it instead.

In short, President Hoover urged:

Reduction of Armaments

Creation of a Common Measurement Formula

Affirmation that Armament Needs are Relative

Compromise with Britain on the Basis of Tonnage Transfer

"Measuring Stick." Engineers like to express themselves in letters and symbols. Without saying so officially, Ambassador Gibson conveyed unmistakably to correspondents that he had received from President Hoover a draft formula or naval "measuring stick," in which "A" stood for age, "C" for calibre, "D" for displacement. The list of categories remains as under Calvin Coolidge: 1) Capital Ships; 2) Aircraft Carriers (both of these already limited under the Washington Conference Treaty); 3) Cruisers; 4) Destroyers; 5) Submarines. With correspondents Mr. Gibson went so far as to indicate, several days after his speech, that the British had not even yet asked for details of the "A. C. D." formula, though they knew that he stood ready to reveal it at any time in confidence.

British Reaction. The Admiralty experts at Geneva were visibly perturbed lest His Majesty's Government should be hornswoggled by a Quaker-Engineer into anything so heretical as reduction of the Royal Navy. It was precisely this attitude of the British experts which sent the Coolidge Naval Limitation Parley on the rocks (TIME, Aug. 15, 1927). Today however, as President Hoover very well knows, Great Britain is on the eve of a General Election and her people want nothing so much as reduction of armaments followed by reduction of taxes. The President with great astuteness made his offer at a psychological moment. It could not be turned down by British statesmen, whatever the attitude of the Admiralty.

Despite the enormous influence of the historically potent Admiralty, the speech of Ambassador Gibson forced the following expression of official approval from the three statesmen most responsible for orienting the Empire's foreign policy:

Baron Cushendun, Chief British Delegate at Geneva, addressing the Commission a few minutes after Ambassador Gibson sat down: "No one can fail to be struck with the friendly, conciliatory and helpful spirit of Mr. Gibson's declaration, and I should like, so far as I am concerned, speaking on behalf of the British Government, to say that it is in that spirit we also desire to approach this very complicated and difficult question.

"I would go a little further, but cannot commit myself at the present moment with regard to any specific proposition contained in that declaration. We should have to see it in print before we could do that, but, following it as closely as I could, I am able to say that, so far as any general principle is concerned, there is nothing Mr. Gibson has said with which I cannot express agreement."

Sir Austen Chamberlain, British Foreign Secretary, addressing the House of Commons: ''His Majesty's Government have noted with much interest the new criteria suggested by Mr. Gibson. We attach great importance to the possibilities opened by the greater elasticity given by his suggestions for adjustments of the agreed naval strengths to the different circumstances of the two Powers."

Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, to a wildly cheering campaign audience at Bristol: "I wish to say at once that we cordially welcome these new suggestions which appear to us very helpful and full of promise. Above all, we welcome and we appreciate the enlightened spirit in which President Hoover has approached this difficult problem.

"Mr. Gibson declared that the purpose of his Government was to secure not merely limitation but reduction of arma ments, and their desire was that reduction should be applied not to this or that class of war vessel only but to every class.

"On behalf of His Majesty's Government, I make the same declaration."

Litvinov Nettled. Proposals almost exactly similar to all four of President Hoover's points had been made to the Conference over and over again by Com rade Maxim Maximovitch Litvinov, Chief Soviet Delegate. Fortnight ago Mr. Gib son sat with speech in pocket -- though no one guessed its bombshell contents then -- while Comrade Litvinov made his proposals once more and received his usual thoroughgoing snub.

Naturally Comrade Litvinov could not resist a temptation to cry the equivalent of "Copy cat!" last week, a most unwise thing to do because the Soviet Government is now making every effort to get itself recognized by President Hoover. "I scarcely know,'' said Litvinov scathingly, "whether Mr. Gibson spoke in support of my plan or in spite of it!"

Concession on Land. When Herbert Hoover went to Belgium in 1915 as Commissioner for Relief, he found Hugh Gibson as First Secretary of the American legation in Brussels and the two men soon became closest friends. During 1918-19, Mr. Gibson was detailed by the State Department for special and extraordinary duty under Mr. Hoover, then Director General of Relief. So intimate are President and Ambassador today that Mr. Gibson dared, two days after his naval speech last week, to pledge the U. S. to a most vital concession with respect to land armaments in a second blue-bolt speech delivered extemporaneously.

Seldom or never before has the representative of a Great Power made-up-as-he-went-along such vital words. Broach ing the problem of how the numbers of soldiers should be reduced, Mr. Gibson said, speaking of the Draft Convention over which the Commission has been dawdling for years (TIME, April 4, 1927):

"We are approaching a question on which the difference of opinion has been so fundamental that neither of the two schools of thought within the Commission has hitherto found it possible to make concessions. . .

"We have always maintained that trained reserves [as well as soldiers of regular armies] should be included with peacetime armaments [in planning for reductions], since both actually exist in time of peace. In our eyes, a nation which possesses an adequate and equipped trained reserve is in a position promptly to undertake an offensive battle.

"In these principles, for which we stood during the first reading [of the draft convention], we still believe; nevertheless, as I indicated the other day, if we are to be able to join in a common draft, it will be necessary for concessions to be made not only on the part of one but on the part of every delegation here present.

"With this in mind I am able to declare that the American Government as a practical matter is disposed to defer to the views of the majority of those countries whose land forces constitute their chief military interest, and in the draft convention before us, to accept their ideas in the matter of trained reserves.

"I venture to express the hope that as a corollary to this attitude the delegations of other countries will in like manner make the maximum of such concessions as they find possible. I do this in no spirit of bargaining.

"There are two ways in which the commission can proceed further. The first is for each delegation to hold up the concessions it is prepared to make until the last minute, seeking in return to obtain other advantages for value received.

"The other method is for the delegations frankly to explain what concessions they are in a position to make, to lay their cards on the table and to create a feeling of candor and harmony that will be conducive to the further success of our work.

"It is in this spirit that I have made a fundamental concession today."

Next day the commission took Ambassador Gibson's cue by voting to omit "trained reserves" from any plan for the general reduction of armaments which they may succeed in drafting. Since the Versailles treaty prohibits Germany from having any "trained reserves"--whereas the other Powers may now have as many as they please--the German delegation vehemently protested the Hoover concession, but to no purpose.

The last word was had by Comrade Litvinov.

"The Soviet delegation," he said, "is convinced that this refusal to limit reserves will destroy the hope of solving the disarmament problem.

"We need not be much impressed by the fact that Mr. Gibson's country, a sea power, agrees to declare its disinterestedness in the question of trained land reserves"