"Final Success"

As the London Conference prepared to end with a quick curtain last week, the Naval Treaty was rushed onto paper by a drafting committee, and who should sit for the U. S. as No. 1 draftsman but the father-in-law of Charles Augustus Lindbergh, small-statured, mighty-minded Dwight Whitney Morrow. This was but just. For although the main U. S. legal prop of the conference maypole has been Secretary of State Henry Lewis Stimson, much of the strenuous work of dancing round and round for eleven weeks, much of the weaving in and out of diplomatic ribbons to make the Naval Treaty, has been done by Mr. Morrow, always keen, wise and cheerful behind his twinkly pince-nez.

"Extremely Improbable." In the last six months big black headlines and long grey news columns have convinced a large section of the U. S. public that a five-power naval disarmament treaty would probably be signed in London, or at least that the President thought it probably would.

This misapprehension was corrected last week by an official White House utterance. "We realized and have realized at all times," said the President, that " a five-power agreement [was]extremely improbable."

"Great Accomplishments." Because the President never expected the five-power conference to make a more than three-power treaty, he could honestly say last week that the document which his representatives were busy drafting with the British and Japanese embodies great achievements.

Exulted Mr. Hoover: "I am greatly pleased . . . final success of the Naval Arms Conference. ... I have telegraphed . . . my admiration.

"Constructive and courageous action . . . final abolition of competition in naval arms between the greatest naval powers [U. S., Britain, Japan] . . . burial of . . . fears and suspicions."

Escalator Clause. Not mentioned at the White House last week was the so-called "Escalator Clause." This had not been written into the treaty at the time the President spoke. Nothing was actually on paper then. But in Sheffield, England, the first lord of the British Admiralty, precise Albert Victor Alexander, positively assured a large audience that the U. S. and Japanese delegations had agreed that the treaty would contain an escalator clause.

The effect of this safeguard, Mr. Alexander said, would be that notwithstanding the U. S. and Britain had agreed to parity and a suitable ratio had been allotted Japan, each of these nations--he had in mind Great Britain--would be allowed to increase its agreed tonnage, upon notifying the others that such increase had become necessary because some power extraneous to the agreement (France, Italy, or Russia, for example) had begun "competitive naval building."

Should Britain take the escalator up, the U. S. would have the right to go up too, to maintain parity, and Japan of course would also build up, to maintain her ratio.

All this might seem academic, except that France has already laid down a building program which the British admiralty has announced will force Britain to take the escalator unless the French cancel part of their program before then, and this Prime Minister Tardieu has said over and over again France will not do.

Silver Lining, Lead Slug. The White House statement, though it left the escalator clause in the dark, did lift a corner of the conference cloud of secrecy and revealed as much of the silver lining of figures as the President thought prudent.

Pure silver was Mr. Hoover's statement that the signatory powers propose to bring their navies to these strengths:

Classes ......................................................Tons

U.S. ..................Britain ...................................Japan*

Capital ships ............460,000 .............460,000 ..........276,000

Eight-inch gun cruisers 180,000 146,800 108,450

Six-inch gun cruisers 143,500 192,200 100,450

Destroyers 150,000 150,000 105,000

Submarines 52,700 52,700 52,700

Airplane carriers ..135,000 135,000 135,000

Totals 1,121,200 1,136,700 788,100

Small excess of British tonnage over U. S.: 15,500.

To show off his silver against a bit of lead, Mr. Hoover pointed out that at the abortive Coolidge three-power naval par ley in Geneva the nearest approach to an Anglo-U. S. agreement was:

Classes Tons

U. S. Britain

Capital ships. .. 525,000 606,000

Large and small cruisers 450,000 450,000

Destroyers 250,000 250,000

Submarines 75,000 75,000

Airplane carriers. 135,000 135,000

Total: 1,435,000 1,516,000

Japan: Not even tentative Japanese figures agreed on at Geneva.

Large excess of British tonnage over U. S.: 81,000.

Plainly progress has been made from the Coolidge slug of lead to the Hoover silver lining. The President said that to reach parity with Britain under the London Treaty will cost U. S. citizens in the next six years "from $550,000,000 to $650,000,000, as compared to . . . between $1,400,000,000 to $1,640,000,000 to attain parity on the Geneva basis." The total saving to taxpayers of the U. S., Britain, and Japan, Mr. Hoover estimated at " perhaps $2,500,000,00.

If the escalator goes up, however, these savings will decrease, may vanish.

Cruisers, Subs, Scraps. Other features of the London Treaty:

1) Whereas President Coolidge quashed his conference when the British would not concede a U. S. superiority of eight ships in the eight-inch or "big" cruiser class, the London treaty allows the U. S. only three more eight-inchers than Britain. Mr. Coolidge felt that a U. S. superiority of eight was vital to balance the fighting advantage of Britain's far-flung naval bases.

2) France and Italy, while abstaining from the London Treaty proper, were expected last week to sign an annex pledging all five powers to "humanize submarine warfare" --i. e., promising not to send a submarine to sink a merchant ship except in circumstances where the people on the ship can be rescued.

3) In a manner not fully explained last week the U. S., Britain and Japan may transfer limited portions of their tonnage between the six-inch "small" cruisers and destroyers, as their needs may demand.

4) Obsolete and semi-obsolete ships earmarked for scrapping under the London Treaty are:

U. S.--The Florida (built 1910) and Utah (1909), scrapped, and either the Arkansas (1911) or the Wyoming (1911) converted to a training ship.

Britain--The Marlborough (1912), Emperor of India (1913), Benbow (1913) and Tiger (1914) scrapped, and the Iron Duke (1912) converted.

Japan--The Hiyei (1912) converted.

Top Dog Wakatsuki. Against the granite conviction of President Coolidge that, if five represents the U. S. or the British naval strength in any class, then three represents the most that can be allowed Japan, repeated waves of Japanese diplomacy burst in vain.

Japan accepted the 5-5-3 ratio for capital ships at Washington, therefore she must accept the same ratio in cruisers, destroyers, submarines -- contended Mr. Coolidge.

A glance at Mr. Hoover's figures shows that parity with the U. S. and Britain in submarines is conceded by the London Treaty to Japan, a ratio of 1-1-1.

In destroyers the ratio in round figures is 10-10-7, in small cruisers about 7-10-5, in large cruisers roughly 10-8-6. In battleships alone does the London Treaty carry on the Washington Treaty ratio of 5-5-3.

This may well be called the greatest victory for Japanese diplomacy since Versailles, when she won famed Yap, Key island in the Pacific cable system.

*Omitted by the President.

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