Trials of a Treaty

President Hoover's desire to get the Senate to ratify the London Naval Treaty resulted last week in great marches and counter-marches between the Capitol and the White House, charges and counter-charges between the Senate and the Department of State. The President was more actively aroused than ever in his determination to keep the Senate on the job until the Treaty should be disposed of.

No less determined was Senator Hiram Johnson, captain of the tiny army of Treaty opponents in the Senate, to delay matters to such a point that the London agreement would have to go over until next winter's session of Congress. Last week the Johnson brigade of twelve did not grow in size but it grew in obstructive influence.

Callers. First to call on President Hoover last week were Senators Watson, Republican Leader, and Moses, the Senate's President pro tempore. Their request: that the President consent to postponing Treaty action until after the November elections instead of at a special-for-Senators-only session immediately following the present one. Dolefully Leader Watson explained that the Senate had been in continuous session for 16 months and was exhausted. He warned that at a special session the Senate was likely to walk out on the President and leave his Treaty dangling midair, either by voting to adjourn sine die or by deliberate failure to produce a quorum. To these arguments the President was adamant. He flatly refused to consider any program of postponement.

"Immaterial." In an effort to clear up the discordant situation President Hoover summoned his onetime political friend, Senator Borah, who as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has the Treaty nominally in charge. Not since last year when their friendship was ruptured by tariff and farm relief differences had the President consulted the gentleman from Idaho. For 45 minutes Senator Borah, apathetic toward the Treaty's virtues, listened to the President tell of his hopes and fears, walked out to say it was "immaterial" to him when the Treaty was disposed of.

Time Killing. Unable to kill the Treaty, "Captain" Johnson killed time instead by a great hue and cry for all the confidential papers leading up to and through the London parley. He was indignant when Secretary of State Stimson sent him only paraphrases of these papers.

Exclaimed Senator Johnson: "The American people are entitled to all the information. ... To coerce action before Senators are fully informed, to compel consideration before every scrap of information and every pertinent document is before them should be resented by every individual Senator."

"Extraneous Matter." What Senator Johnson wanted to know was why the U. S. delegation had receded in its big-cruiser demand from 23 to 18 vessels. Chairman Borah asked Secretary Stimson for more private data. Secretary Stimson returned a "confidential memorandum which will answer as far as possible" Senator Johnson's questions, and a refusal in these words:

"Respecting the other papers, I am directed by the President to say that their production would not be compatible with the public interest.

"These requests call for the production and possible publication of informal and confidential conversations, communications, and tentative suggestions of a kind which are common to almost every negotiation.

"If the confidence in which they were made to the American delegation in London is broken, it would materially impair the possibility of future successful negotiations between this Government and other nations. . . .

"The question whether this Treaty is or is not in the interest of the United States and should or should not be ratified by the Senate must be determined from the language of the document itself and not from extraneous matter.

"There have been no concealed understandings in this matter, nor are there any commitments whatever."

Statesman Stimson realized as well as anyone that by withholding information relative to the Treaty's inception he was playing directly into the hands of "Captain" Johnson. To fortify his position in advance he issued a supplementary statement from the State Department in which, besides quoting many a precedent for refusing the Senate diplomatic material, he said:

"I'm well aware that some of the opponents are likely to say that these confidential papers are being kept confidential to cover up some secret understanding or mistake or indiscretion of the American delegates. That is nonsense. . . . The Treaty represents the full measure of American rights and obligations and the work of the delegation must be judged by that."

"Silly and Worse." Senator Johnson, alert, tripped Secretary Stimson on one of the precedents he had quoted by showing that President Washington in 1796 withheld the Jay Treaty papers not from the Senate but from the House of Representatives. Declared Senator Johnson of Secretary Stimson: "It is silly and worse for an individual to contend that he can put into the public record a part of the correspondence bearing on the Treaty and then, holding up his hands in holy horror, pretend that the giving of all of it to his partner in treaty making would be incompatible with the public interest. . . . This is the question and it cannot be avoided by a half-quotation from Washington which is utterly set at naught by the full context nor by any pretense of safeguarding delicate international secrets."

Pratt Praised. A prime charge of anti-Treaty men has been that Britain dictated the kind and number of cruisers the U. S. might have. Provocative to anti's and disturbing to the Treaty's friends was a load of British praise which fell last week upon Admiral William Veazie Pratt, commander-in-chief of the U. S. fleet, as one of the few U. S. Navy men to support the pact. In London the Naval & Military Record, semi-official organ of the British Admiralty, declared:

"The volte-face of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Navy on the subject of eight-inch-gun cruisers is decidedly interesting. . . . Apparently the conversation (or dubiety, whichever it may be) occurred whilst Admiral Pratt was in London with the American delegation, and it does not seem unreasonable to attribute it to contact with British naval officers and the hearing of views which presumably had not before suggested themselves to him. . . . Such assumption is gratifying to our sense of confidence in our navy, but Admiral Pratt merits a tribute for having the courage not merely to be influenced against his preconceived ideas, but for braving the prejudices of his countrymen."*

*The Naval & Military Record was mistaken. Newsmen who attended the London Conference heard Admiral Pratt opine, before he or the U. S. delegation ever reached London, that the U. S. "does not really need" all the cruisers authorized by Congress.

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