Monday, May. 23, 1938

Soldiers in the Sky

ARMY & NAVY

One day last week at Mitchel Field. Long Island, Major General Frank Maxwell Andrews considered it necessary to issue the following communique: "I notice from some press reports that there is a tendency to indicate that the Army GHQ Air Force is planning to fight a war by itself. I would like to correct that impression. . . We must realize that in common with the mobilization of the air force in this area, the ground arms of the Army would also be assembling, prepared to take the major role in repelling the actual landing forces. ... I want to ask that you do not accuse us of trying to win a war alone."

Good-humored General Andrews' remarks were justifiable on several counts. All along the middle and upper Atlantic Seaboard there were soldiers in the sky, playing war in the first full maneuvers staged alone by General Headquarters Air Force. Relations between the air service and the Army at large were better than at any time since 1935, when GHQ A. F. was established as a compromise between those who wanted an entirely separate air force and those who wanted to keep the Army's wings tied securely to the ground command. But the entente was not sufficiently strong to withstand a barrage of one-sided and slightly inaccurate publicity calculated to exalt airmen above groundmen. Having paid his respects to diplomacy, the General then proceeded to get on with the war.

The war was supposed to have been started by a coalition of Asiatic and European powers, the Blacks, while the U. S. fleet was busy fighting in the Pacific. The Blacks were about to invade the U. S. with two fleets, and it was the job of General Andrews' 187 combat planes and 3,000 men "to concentrate first; to reach out and attack targets in advance of the ground arms, with the general mission of weakening and disorganizing the enemy to the limit of our ability before he comes into contact with these ground forces."

Completely proved at the outset was the fact that GHQ A. F. could assemble a scattered force at unfamiliar airports within a minimum of time. Most spectacular feat in this phase was the transcontinental movement of 945 men. 42 planes, by Brigadier General Delos C. Emmons' First Wing, normally based at March and Hamilton Fields, Calif. Brash, toughly amiable General Emmons, whom many of his comrades look upon as a likely successor to Commanding General Andrews when the latter retires, transformed 16 Douglas bombers into transports, shuttled them and their pilots as many as eight times across the continent, based his entire force at New Haven. Conn, and nearby airports in the New England area. From Barksdale Field, La.. came Brigadier General Frederick S. Martin, who led the Army's round-world hop in 1924, and his Third Wing with 756 officers and men, 47 pursuit and attack planes. Commander of the Second Wing, based normally at Langley Field. Va., temporarily at Middletown. Pa., was Brigadier General Arnold Norman Krogstad, whose bombardment squadrons include nine of the famed Boeing B-17s, four-engined, 3,400 horsepower, 16-ton "flying fortresses."

Making up the fortunes of war somewhat as he went along, from headquarters at Long Island's Mitchel Field. General Andrews hourly created situations calling for related but distinct missions. Early in the game, three of General Krogstad's Boeings, only U. S. military ships capable of flying extreme distances (3,000 miles) with heavy loads, were turned to reconnaissance duty, loaded with a full complement of officers, newspaper correspondents, broadcast announcers, and dispatched seaward. Their objective was none other than Benito Mussolini's superliner Rex, whose captain had obligingly radioed his course and probable position. Nevertheless, Navigating Officer Curtis Selby did a noteworthy job, guided the squadron through squalls which at times turned journalistic faces a gangrenous green, met the Rex precisely at the intended point. Having found and been cheered by the enemy, the "flying fortresses" rocketed home at 240 miles an hour.

Nobody can tell how successful a fighter is going to be simply by watching him work out on the bag. But you can get a pretty good notion of his form and footwork. At the conclusion of the week's other maneuvers (see map) it was certainly not announced whether the Army Air Corps could or could not knock out an invader on the U. S. east coast. But the Air Corps' footwork came in for some high-grade scrutiny and analysis.

New York Times's, Hanson W. Baldwin, one of the best informed newspaper writers on military air tactics, found that with the maneuvers half over the tangible conclusions added up to the following: navigation and bombing, "tremendously improved"; supply service, good; communications, slow but soundly organized; staff direction, good; but in the opinion of some flying officers could be improved by the addition of non-flying tacticians. Finally and most important: "The Army really has as yet no air force, but merely the good beginnings of one."

Good Beginnings may well strike the average U. S. citizen as an optimistic phrase, considering that for this supposedly full-strength concentration, GHQ A. F. mustered only 222 planes, flew only 187. There are only 1,226 in the whole army, 1,022 are on order. The Army's explanation is threefold: 1) Headquarters Air Force is the consolidated combat unit of the Army Air Corps, does not include units detailed in the Pacific, training planes, obsolescents, types in experimental or production stages; 2) War Department projects its mainland forces, land and air. on a defense basis, does not hanker for anything like the mass fleets being frenziedly assembled by European powers; 3) even by modest U. S. standards. Army Air Corps is exceedingly short on numbers of modern planes, long on technical design and efficiency of its best types. But the Army Air Corps counts some of these types as the best in the air as of 1938, and at last week's great game pointed with pride to its:

B-17 Boeing Bomber. Thirteen are in service. 26 on order. Speed, 250 m. p. h.; range, 3,000 miles; capacity, four 2,000-pound bombs or seven 1,100 pounders, plus four rapid-fire machine guns.

Seversky P35 and 36 pursuit. There are 30 on hand and have a top speed of 275 m. p. h., 1,000-mile range, are the only GHQ A. F. planes able to outfly, out-maneuver Boeing Bombers.

Northrup A-17s and 17-A attack. Attack planes were first developed by the U. S., combine speed, light bombing, immense firing power to harry bombers and ground forces. Like the Seversky pursuits, the Air Corps' newest attacks--13 Curtiss twin-engined A-18s -- were grounded last week by structural or motor trouble. The Northrup A-17s and 17-As have 190 m.p.h. speed, 600-pound bomb capacity, gunfire rate of 4,000 rounds per minute.

Douglas DC-32 transport. This ship is converted from airline transport designs. Latest observation planes, not flown in maneuvers, are North American O-47s, whose 1,000-mile range will be tripled by forthcoming models.

For tactical purposes, GHQ A. F. last week assumed that its available planes represented 699 ships. By next year it expects to be well toward this total, by 1940 or 1941 to have 1,200. Congress this year has tentatively approved a 1938-39 Air Corps appropriation of $70,556,972, has authorized expenditure of $25,250,000 for new aircraft. Thus by 1941 the force should have 2,149 planes, with the assurance of the $34,000,000 required to replace 340 annually outmoded planes, 130-odd washed out by crashes each year. Last week 13 militantly liberal House Military Affairs Committeemen visited happy General Andrews, comfortingly indicated that they think the Air Corps worthy of its hire.

Sky Soldiers. Planes are no good without good men. To train its flying men, U. S. Army Air Corps has invested $16,833,733.50 in Randolph Field at San Antonio, Tex. On Randolph's 1,900-acre main field and six auxiliary fields, overworked instructors are currently schooling the unprecedented total of 440 cadets, 93 student officers, nine National Guard officers. If academic mortality holds up, about half of these will fail, 7% of the graduates eventually will receive Regular Army commissions. Remainder will put in some time at Army pay, go into reserve, await the next war.

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