"Chamberlain Offensive"

Political necessity often makes hash of military strategy. The Spanish War is brimful of campaigns politically wise but militarily dumb. Examples: 1) the "prestige" battle of the Ebro River last autumn which cost the Rebels 70,000 men they could ill afford to lose; 2) the Loyalists heroic, costly defense of Madrid, the capital, at the same time that they were losing Malaga, strategically far more important.

Three weeks ago the Rebels began another "political" campaign, this time to take Catalonia. Midwinter is not the best season to fight in mountainous western Catalonia, but Dictator Benito Mussolini was about to start haggling with Neville Chamberlain and he wanted a quick military success for his side in Spain. Il Duce, having made sure of a Franco victory, could offer to withdraw his troops from Spain--provided Mr. Chamberlain would arrange a few concessions for him elsewhere. Politically conscious Loyalists rightly dubbed the new Franco campaign the "Chamberlain Offensive."

Gained. Last week's "Chamberlain Offensive" netted the Rebels two important highway junctions, Artesa de Segre and Borjas Blancas, the two ends of the Loyalists' first line of defense. At one point they got within about 30 miles of Tarragona, now three-fourths destroyed by continuous air bombardment, but they were still 65 miles from Barcelona. Moreover, the Rebels would have to crack two other natural, well-fortified last lines of defense before the drive would really scare Barcelona.

At week's end weather had slowed the offensive down to a relentless crawl. The drive at the southern end of the Catalan line was carried out by the Moroccan Army Corps of General Juan Yague, most brilliant of the Rebel commanders. Together with General Jose Solchaga's Navarrese, this corps threatened the Loyalist-held Ebro River pocket. In the North the Rebel action was carried by General Garcia Valino's Maestrazgo Corps and General Jose Moscardo's Aragonese.

Lost. Meanwhile, the Spanish Civil War turned into a tail-chase when the Loyalists struck back at Generalissimo Franco on the barren plains of Extremadura, in southwestern Spain. The front there has always been loosely held, and old General Jose Miaja, Loyalist ''Savior of Madrid," chose this spot for an offensive which at first had all the earmarks of a local diversion. As he pushed on 20 miles in three days, the campaign assumed the proportions of a major threat to the Rebel-held corridor along the Portuguese frontier.

Basic reality of the Extremadura front is that a Rebel offensive there would not be fatal for the Loyalists, while a Loyalist offensive is a menace to Rebel communications. At week's end General Miaja had taken valuable mining country, had occupied Valsequillo and Blazquez, had cut the Cordoba-Almorchon Railway. The important lead-mining city of Penarroya, also the hydro-electric power centre for Seville, was surrounded, and Loyalist troops pushed within 25 miles of the main Seville-to-Burgos railroad line.

All this was very disturbing to tall, red-suspendered Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, military ruler of southern Rebel Spain. Long on radiorating ability but short on generalship, General Queipo de Llano was said to have incurred the ire of El Caudillo Franco for not defending his bailiwick better. It seemed likely that El Caudillo would be forced sooner or later to pay some attention to Extremadura, perhaps transfer some badly needed troops from Catalonia.

Thus, Dictator Mussolini could get at best only minor satisfactions last week from his Spanish allies. The gains of the "Chamberlain Drive" in the north were balanced by losses due to the "Anti-Chamberlain" offensive in the south.

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