Monday, Sep. 18, 1939

War Aims

Into a German munitions factory last week walked Field Marshal Hermann Wilhelm Goring, most popular (after Hitler) and most portly of Nazis. On the eighth day of Germany's advance into Poland, he had a great job to do. To munitions workers standing with outstretched arms in the shadow of long-barreled artillery, to Germans waiting at the radio all over the Reich, to listeners in countries at war with Germany or neutral, Adolf Hitler's second in command came bearing tidings of victory, offers of peace, warnings of struggle, and bad news.

The Marshal did not speak softly. He knew his audience. Cheering workmen wanted to hear of the victory. He told them: "German arms on land and in the air have achieved what has been considered unbelievable." They wanted to hear that the Westwall was safe. He said so: "If they should be mad enough to attack our western line, streams of blood will flow." They wanted something to laugh over: "Old Chamberlain said he'd like to live to see the day when Hitler would be removed. Well, he has reached Methuselah's age, and I'm not sure he'll attain his goal." They wanted praise: "No power on earth has such a munitions industry. None has as good skilled workers. None has such intelligent workers."

But along with all this there was: "You must believe me if I tell you that the thesis of a long war weakening a nation is not true. With every year we will grow stronger."

There went the dream of the Blitzkrieg, the lightning war, over in no time.

Where was Italy? For two hours the Field Marshal talked, joked, praised the Fuehrer, talked of Russia's raw materials, did not once mention Mussolini or the Axis.

What about the blockade? "In the World War the blockade was complete. That was uncomfortable. Then we were not prepared for that. Now we are. But how does the blockade look today? . . . Damned thin."

Hardheaded, commonsensical, down-to-earth, tough guy-to-tough guys as the Fuehrer is mystical, Field Marshal Goring made a good job of it. For home consumption he piled up the cheering news: Victory in Poland within two weeks ("our divisions marched as humans never marched before") would release 70 divisions for the Western Front. At the moment Germany's coal ran short--"and I might say at that very exact moment"--the seizure of Polish mines* relieved the strain. The failure of Britain to attack meant "their desire to fight does not seem too great." Reassuring was the failure of Britain to bomb Berlin. Then there was the hope that Britain and France could be divided--"England will fight to the last Frenchmen--remember that, you Frenchmen."

For foreign consumption Field Marshal Goring adroitly suggested that Germany would consider peace negotiations. But "you will not dictate another Versailles to us, my dear Britons. . . . Do not mistake our offer of peace for weakness. We have a deep will to peace. It is greater and deeper in the spirit of the Fuehrer."

Significance. For all his talk, the Field Marshal announced nothing concrete about raw materials, nor did he clarify German-Russian relations. Jeers at the blockade were scarcely enough to a generation that remembered the starvation of 1918. Violence of his denunciations of British leaflet propaganda dumped on Germany suggested an underlying fear of it: "To think these laughable flyleaves might have any effect! Chamberlain may know something about umbrellas, but he knows nothing about German propaganda. . . . No, Mr. Chamberlain, we want peace, but giving up the Fuehrer, as others think we might, is too big a price to pay for peace. . . ."

Hard-headed Nazis scarcely expected Britain and France to accept peace offers, hoped rather to maneuver into a position where they would seem, both in German and in neutral eyes, guilty of prolonging war. The first response from London was disquieting. The War Cabinet met, decided: 1) to base Britain's policy on the assumption that the war will last three years or more; 2) to instruct all Government departments to make plans on that assumption; 3) to expand production, especially munitions, to meet the demand implicit in that policy; 4) to maintain export trade in the interests of the civil needs of the country.

Meanwhile officials set about explaining to Britons, and trying to explain to Germans, why peace with Adolf Hitler was impossible. In a broadcast to Germany Prime Minister Chamberlain was polite: "You are told by your Government that you are fighting because Poland rejected your leader's offer. . . . The so-called 'offer' was made to the Polish Ambassador . . . two hours before the announcement by your Government that it had been 'rejected.'

"You may ask why Great Britain is concerned. . . . Why did we feel it necessary ... to defend this Eastern power when our interests lie in the West, and when your leader has said he has no interest in the West? The answer is--and I regret to have to say it--that nobody In this country any longer places any trust in your leader's word. . . . Your leader is now sacrificing you, the German people, to a still more monstrous gamble of war to extricate himself from the impossible position into which he has led himself and you. In this war we are not fighting against you, the German people. . . ."

*Total German coal production: 186,000,000 tons; average production of Polish mines (Upper Silesia and former Czech mines seized last year): 49,000,000 tons, estimated German war needs, at least 300,000,000 tons.

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