"Condemned to Death"?

In Paris last week Finnish Minister Dr. Harri Holma told newspapermen that unless Finland gets more help quickly Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim's army is "condemned to death." In Helsinki sturdy old President Kyosti Kallio once more offered to negotiate "an honorable peace." This was no more than Finland had been offering since the war began,* but it proved to the Finns who are getting hurt in this war that their Government is always willing to negotiate. And Minister Holma's scare talk was less a cry of desperation than a part of the Finnish campaign to speed up the flow of aid which is already more than a trickle.

Last week eleven U. S. planes were landed in Bergen and immediately transshipped to Finland, Italian fliers were raiding Soviet air bases (Moscow denied that Kronstadt was raided), thousands of Swedes were flying and fighting on skis for Finland; an American volunteer aviator, one William H. Wallace Jr., was reported killed and then not killed; a deepening stream of men, materials and money was flowing from England, France, Italy and Scandinavia, not to mention the relief funds collected by Herbert Hoover (see P. 38).

As if in anticipation of growing Finnish strength, Russia let loose a terrific attack.Soviet bombing planes in mass formation unloaded their bombs over seaports and rail centres, killed an estimated 150 civilians in three days, and reportedly bombed Viipuri's ancient cathedral. At the same time the Soviet Army tried to storm the Mannerheim Line by a direct frontal attack.

For eight hours one night shells rained on the Finnish defense works while the Finns burrowed into their underground shelters. As dawn broke the barrage stopped and silence hung over the isthmus.

Then the Finns heard the drone of Russian bombers rising from their bases behind the Soviet lines. In close formation they flew high over the Finnish lines and dropped their loads. At the same time long rows of tanks moved forward.

Ahead of it each tank pushed a sledge, armored on the sides and top, filled with Russian soldiers. As the tanks reached the Finnish lines they halted and crawled around to the front of the sledges. The infantrymen got out and advanced behind the tanks.

Finnish machine guns and rifles picked the Russians off; the tanks could not get through the Finns' granite defense line.

Back went the tanks for more infantry and all day the assault continued. When night fell the artillery took up the battle again and the Finns could not sleep in the din.

The Russians had another trick up their sleeves. One night high-flying planes dropped men by parachute behind the Finnish lines. The Russians had tried this on a small scale early in the war, but this time there were scores of men. They were armed with light machine guns, tools for cutting telegraph wires, portable radio sets.

First the Finns heard of them was when they got nervous and began shooting.

After that it was easy for the Finns, who knew the territory, to spy them out and pot them.

The Finns also discovered how to deal with the armored sledges. Well placed hand grenades split the armor; machine guns did the rest. The Russians soon abandoned this tactic, went back to sending infantry across behind the shelter of the tanks.

In five days of successive battering the Russians pushed a few miles nearer to Viipuri (a Swedish dispatch had them five miles nearer, within 20 miles of the city).

But the Finns, with their defense-in-depth fortifications, were still holding a well-constructed line. Although the danger of a break-through was greater, Russia was thousands of men and many tanks away from taking Viipuri.

Worst feature of the attack for the Finns, aside from the men they lost, was the fact that they had to withdraw troops from north of Lake Laatokka, where they had trapped two Russian divisions, and throw them into action on the isthmus.

Accomplishment of the "greatest victory" of the war which the Finns were anticipating last fortnight (TIME, Feb. 5) was prematurely reported to be near at hand despite this withdrawal; the report was denied by the Finnish high command; revived again, denied again. If the Russians had the man power and supplies to develop two heavy attacks at the same time, one on the isthmus and one north of the lake, the plight of the Finns might indeed be desperate and the costly, 60-day Russian fire-hose attack might come to something at last.

* A Finnish white paper, received in the U. S. last week, established: i) that in the negotiations preceding the war Russia had let it be known that she suspected Finland of conspiring against her; 2) that Finland had been willing to accede to "almost all" the Russian demands ex cept the one for a naval base and garrison at Hanko.

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