Weygand v. Darlan

While Free Frenchmen fought Vichy Frenchmen in Syria last week (see p. 21), in Vichy two of the most potent Vichy Frenchmen disagreed. If the disagreement did not prove that there was any slackening of Vichy's collaboration with the Nazis, it at least proved that the men of Vichy could still violently differ about degrees and methods of collaboration, that Adolf Hitler had not managed to force them all into one goose-stepping mold.

Up from Algeria to Vichy flew the trim-mustached little Commander of the French North African Army, General Maxime Weygand, for conferences with Marshal Henri Philippe Petain and other chiefs of state. Behind closed doors spruce little General Weygand collided with Vichy's chief contact man with the Nazis, sly little Vice Premier Admiral Jean Franc,ois Darlan. Their collision was heard outside the closed doors and reverberated in diplomatic circles for days.

It was reported that General Weygand had not only flatly refused certain demands of Admiral Darlan but had countered with sharp demands of his own. At week's end, when General Weygand flew back to Algeria, it was said that he had won his way, and had been given complete direction of Vichy's colonial "foreign policy." General Weygand's chief demands supposedly were that:

> Vichy would resist by force any military or political encroachments--by inference, Nazi or otherwise--on French North Africa.

> Vichy would not take military action in Africa against the De Gaullists or against De Gaullist territory.

>He, General Weygand, would take no responsibility for whatever happened in Syria, which was not to be considered as linked in any way with the defense of the French African Empire.

Many observers took all this with more than a grain of salt. Heavy Nazi infiltrations have long been reported in French Morocco. Fortnight ago it was said that French North African troops had crossed the Sahara to a camp near the De Gaullist headquarters around Lake Chad.

It seemed likely that General Weygand was chiefly worried that Vichy might call on him to spare more troops and supplies --for Syria or elsewhere--than he was willing to spare. Possibly Vichy had already done so. It was also suggested that he deeply feared that many of his troops might desert if called upon to fight the De Gaullists or the British.

But the Darlan-Weygand collision at least gave weight to the frequently stated theory that Vichy's course is determined less by aging Marshal Petain than by his more active subordinates.

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