Awful Test

The histories of wars are red with tales of unfit officers whose incompetence cost other men their lives, and their country, battles. Such tales there are bound to be after the next U.S. war, and many of them will be true. For, in the last analysis, war is the only sure test of an Army. This is a fact that every soldier knows, even if he does not speak of it.

Last week, with a foresight rare in U.S. military history, the army prepared to apply the awful test of war to U.S. officers before they actually go to battle. Said Under Secretary of War Robert Porter Patterson (in a letter to House Speaker Sam Rayburn): "It is imperative that during the emergency the Secretary of War have authority to vitalize the active list of the Army, removing therefrom those officers who are unable to stand up under the strain to which they must be subjected if we are to build up a modern Army capable of meeting the demands of modern combat."

Although Mr. Patterson wrote his letter on behalf of Secretary of War Stimson, the man behind this intelligent ruthlessness was the Army's kindly Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall. Since the U.S. technically was still short of war, his test had to be short of war, too. But its application could be as remorseless and effective as he and his assistants chose to make it.

To make the test rapidly effective, General Marshall wanted authority to rip away the red tape which hedges many an unqualified officer. By law, officers who are found unfit by reclassification ("B") boards may cling to a long and cumbersome appeal procedure before they are finally ousted. Congress last week was asked to cut this cackle, by giving final power to remove the unfit, without appeal or palaver, to a new board of five or more General Staff officers.

General Marshall has already begun to pick & choose among his Regular Army officers. Last week he pointed out that, of 500 permanently commissioned colonels (56 to 64 years old), only 30 now have troop commands. Of the rest, some are doing well enough in staff and office jobs (where, said General Marshall, "we need their brains more than their legs"). Others are simply awaiting the ax.

Eliminating unfit officers is only half of it. The Army must also find young and fit ones. To that end, a selection board has lately scanned a list of some 800 majors and lieutenant colonels, recommended the best of them for temporary promotions to colonelcies. Most of these promotions (like most of the head-chopping) will be made on the basis of actual performance in this summer's field maneuvers. These games are not war, but to many an officer now on test they are hell.

At the close of the Second Army's maneuvers in Tennessee (TIME, June 23, et seq.), Lieut. General Ben Lear's harshest words were aimed at "the chain of command"--meaning the officers through whom orders are transmitted from the C.O. to every buck private in the field. Said he:

"Unless the chain of command can be perfected . . . disastrous embarrassments and failures will be encountered during battle. Front-line capabilities of the Army's officers should and must receive the attention of all officers. I regret to say that our chain of command is weak--weak to the extent that if this condition is allowed to continue, the chain, at its weak links, will break whenever an emergency imposes a heavy load."

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