Prelude to Munich, 1941

By last week it was clear, on evidence from several sources, that Adolf Hitler presented no direct demands to Joseph Stalin before his invasion of Russia. On the contrary, while Stalin waited for demands the German Army made ready. When it was ready it marched. Germany had wanted war. Why?

Not to get the resources of Russia for wartime use; war would further disorganize Russia's badly organized productive capacity. Not, as Hitler claimed, to keep Russia from attacking Germany; Hitler knew that Russia would not dare to attack Germany. Germany attacked Russia partly to win anti-Communist support all over the world, more particularly to rid the continent of Europe of the last obstacle to immediate German domination: the Red Army.

Peace by Persuasion? If that Army is destroyed, German domination of the continent will be complete. Even if British land power maintains its slippery foothold in Africa and the Middle East, there will be no power but Germany left in Continental Europe. Little imagination was needed, therefore, to foresee a Hitler peace drive if Russia is beaten--a peace drive ending, if Hitler has his way, in a 1941 Munich settlement.

Hitler, the conqueror, could say: "I have the continent; you cannot dislodge me." Hitler, the geographical claustrophobe, could say: "The German people now have their living space." Hitler, the crusader, could say: "I have destroyed Communism, the menace." Hitler, the man of peace, could say: "Now let's all live cozily together."

Such an offer would appeal to many kinds of appeaser: in the U.S. to Red-hating appeasers as well as isolationist appeasers, in Britain to Munich-minded appeasers who believe that Britain's destiny is in the Empire. It would not appeal to those who see in Hitlerism a fearsome way of life, nor to those who see no way to do business with Hitler and remain free, nor to those who see that one Munich leads to another--and to war.

Peace by Force? Since World War II began, Hitler has never been able to bring himself openly to ask for peace. After the conquest of Poland he made an oblique offer ("there can only be real peace ... if Germany and England come to an understanding") which he later told the German people was a genuine request. The German people have lately become restive, weary of war (TIME, June 30). Said the Nazi Party organ NS Kurier last week: "Whenever and wherever we observe people we notice over and over again little feeling of interest shown in great events of this war. This terrible immaterial behavior is so unbearable that the Government should take steps against it."

Faced by this feeling, Hitler might even try to force a peace. If he conquered Russia, he might propose to stop fighting. He might proclaim his long-awaited European Confederation, begin producing his long-touted New Order, stand before the world as the organizer of Europe. He might make trade offers to Latin America, count on do-nothing sentiment in the U.S. and Latin-American pressure on Britain to soften up the U.S. and Britain for appeasement.

These were matters for speculation. Prolonged Russian resistance would remove them from the realm of speculation, if in the meantime there was no slackening of the British war effort or of the U.S. effort to arm. Yet within the realm of speculation also was the possibility, if Russia proved unexpectedly tough, that the U.S. and Britain would hold their fire, hoping that Hitlerism and Communism would destroy each other. This hope was present at Munich in 1938.

Eden Answers. Such matters of speculation may have been in the mind of Britain's Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden last week as he arose to address an open-air meeting at Leeds. Anthony Eden, no appeaser, may have feared a peace drive; he may have feared that if it came Britain would have no adequate answer ready. He spoke of the necessity of looking ahead, of planning "a truly new order" to stand against Hitler's new order of force. Then he gave Britain's answer to the peace drive in advance:

"We are all out to beat Hitler. We will not let go till we have done the job.

". . . We anticipate that Hitler, at a moment he considers opportune during his campaign in Russia, will seek to present himself in another of his occasional theatrical roles. This time his make-up will be that of a man of peace. Internal conditions in Germany will make this false posturing necessary for him for a spell. . . .

"It might, therefore, be useful that I should now state the position of His Majesty's Government in respect to any peace offer by Hitler. . . . We are not in any circumstances prepared to negotiate with him at any time on any subject. We shall intensify our war effort until he and all he stands for are utterly destroyed. There is no room on the earth's surface for Hitler's way of life and ours."

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