Misery in the Powerhouse

"The efforts of the Allies may be divided in space, but in no circumstances may they be divided in time."

British eyes last week read this sentence and British minds agreed with it. But as to just how it should be applied Britain was divided umpteen ways.

The sentence was written by a Russian whom the British like and can understand, Maxim Litvinoff. As Foreign Commissar before the war, he was a protagonist of collective security--simultaneous moves to keep the peace. Now, as unofficial liaison man, he pleaded for simultaneous moves to win the war.

The idea was not exclusive with Com rade Litvinoff. Many Britons hotly championed it. Last week a Gallup poll showed that 50% more British people were thinking about an invasion of the continent than any other single problem. In a week when the Russians were having serious troubles, more people than ever felt that Britain should do all it could to help itself by helping Russia.

What could the British do?

They could explain why raiding Spitsbergen was more effective than raiding the moon. It was not quite so easy to explain why they had not tried a raid on the Norwegian coast, when the Norwegians were so hopefully insurgent and when their own equipment and chances were so much better than the last time they made that rough trip. In an attempt to explain, War Secretary Captain David Margesson last week wrote his first newspaper article since taking office.

"Anybody who sits on Cape Gris Nez is seven minutes by air and an hour and a half by sea from England, and there are a lot of Germans still sitting around Cape Gris Nez. . . . We must keep enough here to make sure that the enemy cannot destroy or seriously damage what is, after all, the powerhouse of world resistance to the German bid for world domination."

But such words only made the British people miserable, especially when they heard Russian words, like Ambassador Ivan Maisky's: "We need tanks, more tanks, and yet more tanks." They carried many British back to Paul Reynaud's cry for "clouds of war planes."

What could the British do?

They might send tanks. Indeed, they set aside a Tanks-for-Russia Week for the purpose -- but the trip around Africa, across Iran and the Caucasus Mountains was a long one. They might send hundreds of planes, perhaps dropping bombs on Berlin on the way -- but so far the big promises were for 1942.

Many Britons asked themselves if this was equitable: was it enough for the U.S. and Britain to send the tools and let the Russians do the fighting? The British people wanted last week to try the offensive somewhere, no matter what the risks.

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