In Mr. Hull's Office

Not until war blew the lid off diplomacy did the U.S. learn all the last-minute moves with which President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State tried to prevent war with Japan.

Conversations between the President and Japan's envoys, Saburo Kurusu and Admiral Nomura, had reached a stalemate when on Nov. 26 Secretary Hull gave the Japanese a memorandum for a general settlement of the Pacific's problems. The terms it offered were stiff, and high-minded, but to a nation which had not already planned a treacherous attack they might have been tempting:

> Withdrawal of all Japanese troops and naval forces from China and Indo-China.

> Recognition by Japan of Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese National Government.

> Abandonment by Japan and the U.S. (and by other nations, if possible) of all extraterritorial rights in China.

> A new trade agreement between the U.S. and Japan.

> Removal of all restrictions on U.S. funds in Japan, Japanese funds in the U.S.

> An agreement to stabilize the yen with the dollar.

> An invitation to Japan to change sides, join the U.S., Britain, The Netherlands, Russia, Thailand and China in a nonaggressive settlement.

While Mr. Hull and the President waited for Japan's reply, ominous reports of Japanese troop movements in French Indo-China began to pour in on Washington. At week's end President Roosevelt dispatched a personal message to Emperor Hirohito.

Wrote the President: "Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive . . . all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. . . . We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated. . . . I address myself to Your Majesty . . . in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. . . ."

Next day was Sunday. At one o'clock that afternoon (it was 7:30 a.m. in Hawaii) a telephone rang at the State Department. Japan's envoys had a communication for Secretary Hull. Mr. Hull arranged to see them at 1:45. At 2:05 the two impassive envoys stalked in, twenty minutes late. Mr. Hull kept them waiting another 15 minutes for good measure.

At the precise moment that Mr. Hull received them, the news was being received at the White House that Japan had attacked Hawaii. Courtly Mr. Hull took the document which Admiral Nomura gave him, adjusted his spectacles, began to read.

It was the Japanese answer to Mr. Hull's memorandum. It was a flat rejection of the U.S. proposals. It was also an incredible farrago of self-justification and abuse.

Wrote the Japanese: "Ever since the China affair broke out, owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace. . . . The Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions. . . . On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities. and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delay in the negotiations. . . An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations. . . . Therefore . . . the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal. . . ."

Cordell Hull's eyes began to blaze as he read this document. He looked up at Japan's nervous envoys. What Mr. Hull was quoted as saying by the State Department was this : "In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions -- infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

Saburo Kurusu and Admiral Nomura walked out, pale and quiet. Whether they had been cat's paws or knowing agents of Japanese "diplomacy," their job was done. They had played a useful delaying action, helped pave the way for a treacherous attack.

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