Chennault's Antidote

The Japanese radio poured poison into Chungking. Where were the planes, the pilots, the bombs the U.S. had promised China? Why all the painful, handmade preparation of airdromes for U.S. airmen who would never come? Jap bombers would wreck the fields, the Japanese army would capture them, before the Americans could use them to help China's armies or to bomb Japan. And, if the Americans did come, the Japanese would chase them from the skies.

Day after day U.S. Army Air Forces officers in Chungking heard such Japanese broadcasts, kept their wrath and the biggest news of China's war to themselves. The news was that there actually was a small U.S. air force in China and that the force was growing bit by bit. At first it was too small for anything but occasional, unannounced sorties. Not until July 6 did General Joseph W. Stilwell, the top U.S. Commander in China, take off the lid with his Communique No. 1, announcing that the U.S. Army Air Forces were operating in China. Army bombers had struck at Hankow, Canton, Nanchang. U.S. Army fighters had escorted the bombers, downing Jap planes and scorching Jap fields.

Bitter Tea. Under General Stilwell, the U.S. airman commanding these squadrons is Brigadier General Claire L. Chennault, who founded, trained and led the A.V.G. until the Army displaced it (TIME, July 13). Outspoken but discreet, General Chennault last week made no secret of his regret that he had been unable to keep the A.V.G. intact. Only six of his superbly schooled, battle-proved pilots had followed him into Army squadrons. Most of the A.V.G.'s equally skilled and valuable ground staff (including several R.A.F. orphans who were technically ineligible for U.S. service) had also dispersed. They were angry at the summary dismemberment of this group, at the pressure used to induce them to join the Army (many were former Navy and Marine Corps men). Claire Chennault said only: "They deserved to go home, but I regret their disbandment. It was the greatest opportunity an air force commander ever had to get together and train under complete freedom of action a group of fighting men."*

Stronger Tea. Up to last week censors in China had allowed U.S. correspondents to identify two Army bomber units and one pursuit group. General Chennault said that this initial force's job would be to soften up Jap strongholds in China, put the Japanese on the air defensive. More U.S. planes and crews will have to complete the long journeys to Africa, India and China before the Army Air Forces can take a decisive role in China's war or carry the war to Japan itself.

China's spokesmen in the U.S. politely but insistently emphasized her immediate need. Major General Chu Shih-ming, Chinese Military Attache in Washington, declared that with a well-balanced force of 500 U.S. bombers and fighters, China's armies could take the offensive; in other words, 500 would be enough to save China for the present.

General Chu and Claire Chennault will certainly have at least 500 planes, and have them soon, if War & Navy Secretaries Stimson and Knox meant what they said in an Order of the Day on the opening of China's sixth year at war: "The Army and Navy of the U.S. salute their comrades-in-arms in China, and join with them in the firm determination to expel the aggressor from every foot of Chinese soil."

* General Chennault, who knows better than most the problems of licking the Japs in air combat, said a mouthful about U.S. pilot training: "Today emphasis is on mass production of pilots, which I think is wrong, although experts are still demanding a reduction of the pilot training period. I would rather have one good pilot than several mediocre pilots."

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