The Army's Case

Last week Army men marshaled many an argument to show that there was very bad medicine in the Senate amendment to the 18-19-year-old draft which would require a year's training in the U.S. for youngsters before sending them overseas. Chief points:

> Training times for an individual, a small technical unit or a division are not necessarily the same. And large numbers of green soldiers can be assimilated by trained units without impairing efficiency. There is no reason to hold up a whole division of seasoned troops just because it has a sprinkling of troops under 20 who have not been in the Army a year.

>Vacancies in a division may run to thousands, are usually filled with men fresh from three months' basic training. If such a division were to go overseas six months later, a checkup would show many men under 20 with only nine months in the Army, who, under the Senate restrictions, would have to be replaced with older men.

> Ground echelons of Air Forces ground units, which comprise 75% of the Air Forces overseas do not need long training, usually go overseas quickly. The restriction would prevent the Army from putting men under 20 in such units, might seriously hamper the pilot and crew-training program by forcing the Army to strip off older men on the teaching force to go overseas.

> Under the restrictions, a 19-year-old radio technician with only six months in the Army would, for example, be left behind when his unit went abroad (possibly to a spot remote from the enemy). If the Army did not need him in another radio unit just then, his talents would be wasted.

> The intent of the Senate amendment is to save the lives of men under 20, but it will not necessarily work that way: 1) Army death rate in the U.S. is 2.15 per thousand, but in Bermuda it is only half that, in Iceland only 1.62; 2) an 18-year-old could not go to Puerto Rico where the principal hazard is sunburn, but with only one day in the Army he could go into action against Japs in Alaska.

> Britain's rule that 18-year-olds cannot go overseas does not necessarily protect them against risk, because many 18-year-olds in the R.A.F. fly over Europe where the casualties are high; and those in the home Army are in a potential front line.

> The restrictions would probably result in greater casualties among men now under 20. Reason: they probably would be concentrated in combat divisions which would go into action about 1944 without the benefit of older men's judgment to cut down the risks.

> Definition of "actual combat duty" is difficult since the plane has made the whole world a combat zone.

> The restrictions would work against the youngsters by keeping them out of officer-candidate schools while older men who can go overseas are put through first. The U.S. manpower problem would be complicated because higher quotas of the other age groups would have to be inducted in addition to those under 20. Probably 500,000 additional men--farmers, industrial workers or older men with dependents--would have to be drafted and the Department could not carry out its plan to release many older men from service.

> The amendment would handicap the War Department in building an immediately available, powerful striking force to take quick advantage of any opportunity to put a speedy end to the war.

An important fact which apparently had not occurred to the Army: by increasing the size of the static forces in training, the restriction would greatly increase the demands on available (and none too plentiful) war equipment.

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