Why Stalin Signed

DUEL FOR EUROPE -- John Scoff --Houghton Mifflin ($3.50).

When Stalin set the European tinder-box ablaze by signing the nonaggression pact with Hitler in August 1939, the civilized world gasped: How could he? One simple answer might have been that the pact was a characteristic move in the hard-boiled game of Russian foreign policy. But ever since Russia became Germany's Finland, the other United Nations have desired a more detailed explanation of Stalin's pre-invasion policies. John Scott's book is an attempt to supply this explanation.

Author Scott (Behind the Urals), 30, is the son of oldtime U.S. Socialist Scott Nearing. For five years Scott was a worker in Russia's huge steel plant at Magnitogorsk. Later he was Moscow correspondent for London's News Chronicle.

Scott describes his book as "the story of a duel between Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler for the continent of Europe. It is the story of the maneuvering, intrigue and deceit whereby each tried in advance to win the war against the other. . . ."' Author Scott believes that Stalin's behavior was "logical."

Preliminaries. After Munich, Britain and her ally France dickered for an agreement with Russia. But Author Scott believes that Britain at that time really wanted to see Russia crushed by Germany, was negotiating with Stalin principally to keep British leftists quiet. Russia, on the other hand, was using the British talks in Moscow to gain time. Stalin soon decided, says Author Scott, that he could get more from Germany than from Britain--an interlude of peace and, incidentally, half of Poland, the Baltic states, Finland. Hitler was ready to concede the territorial pawns in the game, if he could neutralize temporarily the Russian military threat and get Russian raw materials.

Round One. Once the Russo-German pact was concluded and Germany had invaded Poland, Stalin could feel that he had won Round One. The Russians were pleased that he had kept them out of what Pravda described as "the dirty intrigues of international imperialist swindlers and . . . warmongers."

Round Two. Finland looked like an easy second round. The Kremlin was confident, says Author Scott, that: 1) Finland would capitulate; 2) if there was a war the Finnish workers and soldiers would revolt; 3) revolt or no, the Red Army would quickly win.

As the Finnish fight dragged on, Stalin decided to stop short of total victory. His "recognition" of a "Finnish People's Government" had made him, says Author Scott, "an object of ridicule for [Soviet] streetcar conductors." But most important of all, the invasion of Finland had revealed "considerable deadwood" in the mighty Red Army. In short, Round Two had been "a grotesque blunder" diplomatically; an invaluable proving ground militarily.

Round Three. Next it was Hitler's turn. France was crushed and Britain expected invasion. To gain time to build up the Red Army, Stalin played the German pact for all it was worth. Cracked a British reporter: "Russia has become the largest of the small frightened neutrals." In the first nine months of 1940 Russia shipped nearly 1,000,000 tons of oil and huge quantities of fodder and grain to Germany. Russian industrial production was ruthlessly stepped up (it became a crime for a worker to arrive more than 20 minutes late). Marshal Timoshenko put the Red Army through extended battle practice, stiffened discipline.

The Russo-Japanese nonaggression and neutrality pact was a diplomatic trump for the Kremlin--a way "to impress the Germans," says Author Scott. Stalin and Molotov went personally to the Moscow station to say farewell to the Jap signers. This joy had been celebrated in too much vodka. "Stalin went up to the aged and diminutive Japanese Ambassador General, punched him rather hard on the shoulder with an 'ah ... ha'. . . . The Japanese Military Attache staggered up to the dapper and fastidious . . . Soviet Chief of Protocol and slapped him on the back. Matsuoka got the giggles and thought that the whole business was 'a genuine expression of Soviet friendship.' "

Round Four. By the end of 1940, says Author Scott, "it was clear to all observers . . . that Russia was becoming stronger week by week." Hitler had to strike soon or it would be too late. When he did strike, it was no surprise to Stalin. "Only in terms of minutes or hours" were the Russians caught off guard.

The Winner? In his final chapter Author Scott reviews the possible endings for Round Five of the Nazi-Russian duel. Some of them: 1) a German victory ("I consider this unlikely"); 2) "Stalin and Hitler negotiate a [temporary] peace" ("highly unlikely"); 3) Germany is defeated, revolutions break out all over Eastern and Central Europe. In this very likely event, thinks Author Scott, "Stalin refuses any interference . . . leaves it to Britain and the U.S. to do as they please in Europe." But he may "participate in the 'establishment of order' along with the Anglo-American troops," then "retire behind his frontiers." "In either case Europe might be blessed with 50 years of peace and prosperous collaboration under the principles of the Atlantic Charter if Britain and the U.S. renounced imperialism and balance-of-power organization in Europe and refrained from building up once more a strong Germany as a protection against Bolshevism."

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