Franco and the Rock

Generalissimo Francisco Franco struck a blow last week for Germany. By word and action, as surely as if he had ordered his troops to fire, he compelled the Allies to divert men, equipment and energy from Tunisia (see col. 3) and spend them upon preparations which might have been deferred if Spain were safely neutral.

Franco's words, spoken to the newly reshuffled Falange National Council, told the world precisely where Franco stands and what Franco believes. Said he:

"The liberal world is going down, a victim to its own errors. . . . Mussolini united ... a social urge and a national idea. Later Germany found a new solution ... in National Socialism. . . . The historic destiny of our era will be settled either according to the barbarous formula of Bolshevist totalitarianism, or according to the spiritual, patriotic formula Spain offers us, or according to any other formula of the Fascist nations."

Franco's actions told the world what his words meant in military terms. He mobilized his forces--not on his northern borders, where the Germans might enter Spain, but in the south, where Gibraltar and the Allies in North Africa may be attacked from the rear.

In Spanish Morocco, at General Dwight Eisenhower's rear, Franco has increased his garrisons from about 135,000 to 180,000 men. Ill-equipped and poor though Spain is, some of the forces in Spanish Morocco are partially mechanized. Many are Moors, who are among the world's best soldiers.

Franco's threat bore the Axis stamp and perhaps foreshadowed Axis strategy. Whether Washington's recent diplomacy --kind words to Franco from President Roosevelt, loans, trade pacts--had come utterly to naught remained to be seen. U.S. relations with Franco were as cloudy, and perhaps as expedient, as those with Admiral Darlan. But U.S. and British military men took no chances.

Against an Axis attempt to take Gibraltar, seal the western Mediterranean and thus neutralize many of the benefits of the North African invasion, the Allies could do very little in advance. Gibraltar and its harbor are already chock-full of defenders. But, at the cost of resources sorely needed in Tunisia, they had to prepare to offset the loss of Gibraltar.

Answer to Franco. Engineers labored to perfect airdromes and dock facilities at Casablanca and Dakar, to provide alternate points of entry for planes, men and equipment in case Gibraltar falls and the Mediterranean ports of Algeria are immobilized. Gibraltar is now the principal way station for bombers flown from Britain to North Africa, and perhaps for long-range U.S. fighters. Casablanca (1,200 miles from southern Britain) can serve as a substitute, and as a depot for planes flown from the U.S. via Natal and Dakar; men and equipment can be hauled by rail from Casablanca to upper Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The counter-preparations were well along. Allied strategists hoped that the Axis had missed the boat to Gibraltar.

For the Long Term. The Allies in North Africa had offered Hitler a second front (TIME, Nov. 16) and Hitler had accepted the offer. German reinforcements in Tunisia and even the Afrika Corps's retreat from El Agheila toward Tripoli fitted into the German plan for a counteroffensive. So did Franco's belligerent words & deeds.

The Allies had gone into French Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia with none too many men for the job, and they now have a major struggle to win. The distances are great: to effect a junction of General Montgomery's Army in Libya (based on Alexandria) and General Eisenhower's British and U.S. forces (whose Atlantic base is Casablanca) was like trying to bring together armies from opposite shores of the U.S. (see map), with nothing like the excellent highway and communications facilities of the U.S. Franco's threat was one more strain on Allied manpower and communications.

These were the reasons--if any did--which came nearest to justifying the deal with Admiral Jean Francois Darlan. By peaceful arrangement with Dakar's Governor General Pierre Boisson, U.S. troops last week entered that disputed port, and the Allies' African communications improved.

If some Army spokesmen seemed to be trying to sell Darlan & Co. to the U.S., people on a long-term basis,* it may have been because they expected a long fight in North Africa. Said Lieut. General Henry H. Arnold, chief of the Army Air Forces: "We are up against a cross section of the whole German aerial might." Before the campaign's end, General Arnold foresaw a struggle "which almost certainly will determine supremacy in the air over the Mediterranean, and possibly will determine aerial supremacy over Europe."

* Said the London Observer last week: "To score tactical and temporary victories by adroit maneuver can always be described as 'realism.' But these little gains may prove disastrous in the long run. . . . The 'temporary' arrangement with Admiral Darlan could be justified as a clever one, but . . . intelligence without integrity will fail in the end, and the people know it far better than do some of our politicians."

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