Prelude to Victory

In a guarded hotel above Casablanca's grey-green harbor Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt talked for ten days. The continent of Europe was their oyster, to be pried open, then stabbed with all the armed might at their command. How they would gain the opening, when & where they would strike, were the most important decisions in 1943.

Those decisions would remain secret until they had been carried out. The terse communique that followed the meetings said little more than that complete agreement had been reached, that victory could come only with "the unconditional surrender" of Germany, Italy and Japan. But as a necessary prelude to victory, before victory could even be discussed, a formula had to be found for settling the political confusion in North Africa.

"We Have Met, We Have Talked." Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill did not have to go to Africa to bring General Giraud and General de Gaulle together. But the conflict between Giraud and De Gaulle was indicative of a basic disagreement between U.S. and British foreign policies. Expressive of the disgust which U.S.-backed policies inspired in many Anglo-Saxon minds was a false news bulletin, dated Jan. 7, 1945, which a wit posted in no less a place than Allied Headquarters in Algiers. It read:

Berlin: General Goering was today appointed head of the new German Government by the Allied High Command. A spokesman of this Command said later: "I know nothing of General Goering's past. He has fulfilled every obligation which he has undertaken to us."

Rome: Signor Farinacci, when made Prime Minister today, said: "There is no need to arrest the Fascist leaders. The Party has been dissolved."

Helsinki: Marshal Mannerheim, whom the Allied High Command had today recognized as ruler of Finland, was interviewed by our correspondent. "I am a great believer in Democracy," the Marshal said, "but I have hundreds of thousands of dossiers* to go through yet, and you must remember that Rome was not built in a day."

Every time De Gaulle and Giraud had seemed on the point of agreeing on some form of cooperation, butter had got in the works. Latest blob of butter was the appointment by Giraud of Marcel Peyrouton as Governor General of Algeria. In 1940 Peyrouton was a Minister in the Vichy government; before that he was Vichy Resident General in Tunisia; to General de Gaulle he was unpalatable.

But when Roosevelt and Churchill went to Casablanca, Generals de Gaulle and Giraud could both go without loss of face. The fact was that they had to go, so as not to be left out of the plans that were made there. What passed at their meeting was as secret as other decisions in Casablanca, but they shook hands for cameramen. Their official announcement said only:

"We have met. We have talked. We have registered entire agreement on the end to be achieved, which is the liberation of France and the triumph of human liberties by the total defeat of the enemy.

"This end will be attained by union in war of all Frenchmen fighting side-by-side with all Allies."

Two Roads. The importance of the military decisions taken by Roosevelt and Churchill was indicated by these facts:

1) Joseph Stalin was invited (although he did not attend), and both he and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were kept advised of the proceedings.

2) Both the chief conferees took their top military advisers for land, sea & air, called in their field generals in Africa.

3) The conference lasted for ten days. Even allowing for the President's and the Prime Minister's love of telling stories, enjoying themselves, and sightseeing, the length of their meeting indicated that they had thrashed out serious matters.

The announcement that they had "completed their plans for the offensive campaigns of 1943" sounded like no overstatement of the facts. But even as the President and the Prime Minister met, their military task was changing. Their first object in Europe and Africa had been to relieve the Red Army of German pressure; it was now to capitalize upon the Red Army's successes (see p. 30). Continuously on the offensive since the war's start, Germany was suddenly on the defensive--a defensive which may be nevertheless strong and hard to crack. Essentially, the Allies' task in Europe and their task in the Pacific were now identical: to find the cracks in the enemy defenses, to take the war to Berlin and Tokyo. The chances still were that the first destination would be Berlin.

* A reference to Frenchmen who aided the Loyalists during the Spanish Civil War, were imprisoned in North Africa by Vichy, are yet to be freed.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.