Or Else

The peace-loving nations of the world, which had tragically demonstrated their inability to prevent World Wars I & II, again showed signs of an inability to head off World War III. They had before them the bloody example of their past failure to unite on a common program. Now, facing the vital necessity for a common program, they were still unable or unwilling to unite.

The central problem was Russia. The appalling lack of political and military liaison so far established by the U.S. and Britain with the U.S.S.R. became more pronounced and embarrassing with every victory the Russian armies rolled up. It handicapped U.S.-British strategists in their plans for a continental invasion. It created worries which stemmed as much from the sins and lacks of Anglo-American relations with Russia as from the mysteries of Russian policy. The chief worries were that: 1) Stalin might withdraw from the war when the invaders were driven from Russian territory, thus leaving Hitler free to face the U.S. and Britain; 2) Stalin might let the momentum of his armies spread over the entire Continent.

Germany Loses. Germany had to be defeated first. But this defeat could be best accomplished, and quite possibly could only be accomplished, by coordinated Allied action. For that reason it was necessary for the U.S., Britain, Russia and China to get together on their war plans. Britain and the U.S., through the "unconditional-surrender" conference at Casablanca and through last week's North African High Command agreement, were in close liaison. The Russians still remained aloof. The Chinese, looking in the Anglo-American window, may well have moved, closer to the Russians.

Russia was as uncommunicative about her plans for postwar Europe as she was about military details. Common sense indicated that Russia, for her future security, will demand European concessions--possibly Petsamo in Finland, warm-water ports in the Baltic, a sphere of influence in the Balkans, access to the Black Sea straits. Common sense also indicated that, unless a general and open agreement is reached soon on joint postwar policies, the Allies' present comradeship-in-arms may turn into a barracks brawl. The first chairs were already being thrown by pro-Soviets and anti-Soviets in the Balkans.

Clear Thinking. It was unfortunate but true that this growing state of apprehension played directly into Germany's hands, and would continue to do so unless Washington and London grappled intelligently with the problem. In his weekly magazine, Das Reich, Propaganda Minister Goebbels picked up the ragged theme of recent speeches by Hitler and Goring. He predicted the end of Western civilization if Germany did not remain as a bulwark against Communism, adding slyly: "Perhaps even in London there are a few clear-thinking men who could imagine what that would mean for Britain."

Some U.S. newspapers whose sense of responsibility is confined to their comic strips echoed the Goebbels line. A section of U.S. public opinion was prepared to revive the Red menace.

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Russia, gave an official version of Anglo-Russian relations. He emphasized in a speech broadcast to Europe that Germany was again "flaunting the Red peril." He said that there was a "deepseated wish, or more, a determination to work with the Russians in peace and in the war" that German propagandists could not shake. "Let them reflect for a moment," he said, "upon the common man in Britain and Russia and China, on his way of life ... a spontaneous revolt against anything for which the Fascists stand."

Blood for Blood. These were brave words, but they did not solve the problem of burgeoning Russian influence in Europe and in the Far East. Nor did they obviate the fact that many aspects of U.S. policy, including overtures to the Austrian Habsburgs, the Darlans, the Hungarian Horthys of Europe, are bound to drive Joseph Stalin even farther from any real collaboration with his nominal allies. Walter Duranty, the almost forgotten expert on Russia, last week gave his version of Russia's position in Europe:

"Joseph Stalin is fighting his own war, Russia's war, the war which he foresaw perhaps before anyone else and for which he prepared to defend his country.

"Bolshevism, it has been said, is a new religion, fanatical and iconoclastic. Such a view would present Mr. Stalin as Khaled the successor to Mohammed. Personally I doubt this. I see Mr. Stalin as the clear-minded statesman who looks at East and West . . . both ways at once.

"Will Russia drive into Germany and raise the Red Flag in Europe? She may. She may because the atrocities committed by the Nazis in Occupied Russia have been so frightful that blood must be paid in blood. ... Or he [Stalin] might want no part of Germany. . . . Unless I am mistaken, what Russia really wants is not concerned with Europe. . . ."

Quid pro Quo. Russia's attention may well focus on the Far East. Stalin may ask for "an independent Soviet Republic of Manchuria, affiliated with the U.S.S.R.; a similar Republic of Korea; and even, perhaps, the Northwestern Chinese Soviet Republic of Sinkiang, Ningsia and Shensi." Russia, said Duranty, wants control of West Pacific ports, has no love for Japan and will be willing to cooperate in "our death stroke" against the Japanese when the U.S. puts into action "a really powerful force of airplanes."

Left" out, as usual, in such a deal would be the nationalist aspirations of Free China, now close to economic collapse and pleading to be kept in the war by increased shipments of planes and the reopening of the Burma Road.

The Pay-Off. For Britain and the U.S. the problem was plainer every day: Russia holds too many trumps to be finessed in the game of politics. Equally plain: if the partners in war do not lay their cards on the table soon, there will be the devil to pay.

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