Monday, Mar. 15, 1943

Letter from a General

U.S., British and Dominion correspond ents in North Africa last week got a letter from war-hard, polite General Sir Harold Alexander, General Eisenhower's Commander of Land Forces. It contained: 1) words of caution; 2) a hint of the coming Allied offensive. It said:

". . . My aim is to present the right news to the public in the most efficient way and in the shortest possible time. To do this requires a system. . . . Correspondents are kept up to date and informed of the general military situation. . . . Before a big offensive I see that the press is ready and collected and are at the right places at the right time. In other words, we shall see they get front-row seats in the stalls when the curtain goes up.

"There is one thing I particularly stress, and it is the danger of speculating on future moves. . . . For example, when I was in Burma last year, I laid most careful plans for misleading the Japanese into thinking we would withdraw north towards Myitkyina, whereas it was my intention to slip away and across the Chindwin River at Kalewa, thereby extricating my force from an almost impossible position. . . . To my consternation, the night before we moved, it was given out on the air that 'the British forces are withdrawing to their base at Kalewa.' The result was that we were partially cut off and only after heavy fighting did I save the small force that I had. I lost some of my artillery and 49 tanks out of 50, as well as considerable killed and wounded. The commentator could not have known my plans . . . some 'wise guy' [was] speculating as to what we might do. . . .

"It is our duty to help [the press] and I shall do so. But I cannot do it unless they agree to proper organization which I can control."

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