Trouble in WPB -- Again

"How do we stand in this war at 11 o'clock this morning of April 27, 1943?"

Lieut. General Brehon B. Somervell, Chief of the Army Services of Supply, asked this question of himself, of the upturned faces at the opening session in New York of the Chamber of Commerce convention, and of the nation. Then he gave part of the answer:

The U.S. Army will not be completely equipped until late in 1944--despite the "truly remarkable job American business and industry have done in 17 months." Essential cargo for the available shipping is still difficult to supply. On many occasions equipment has been withdrawn from troops in training to supply troops overseas. Rumors that the army is so flooded with equipment that plants have had to shut down are fifth-column rumors designed to slow production. Some cutbacks in schedules have occurred. But only in one field, ammunition, is there a reserve.

These forthright words of General Somervell shocked the gathered businessmen. If General Somervell knew what he was talking about, war production was not even approaching the crest of the hump.

Tank Surplus? After the shock wore off, businessmen wondered why, then, they had seen plants standing idle. So did civilians who have passed enormous army dumps jammed wheel to wheel with trucks, have seen massed fields of hundreds of tanks. Army Ordnance itself has even complained of a big tank surplus at Chester, Pa. Statisticians recalled further that the cutback of a "few facilities" totaled around $3,000,000,000.

It might be true, as General Somervell stated, that nearly all of the 90 "facilities" affected by recent materiel changes had been restored to production. But production-minded civilians still asked questions. Could a plant built to make tanks, for example, be easily converted to make plane parts? Why was equipment so short? Why was the arms program out of balance? Changing requirements based on battle experience and obsolescence of equipment could not be the whole answer.

Nathan to Army. Into the Army as a private last week went a man who carried many of the answers in his big, black-thatched head. He is huge, gorilla-shouldered Robert Nathan, 34, former chairman of WPB's planning committee. Nathan was one of the few New Dealers who demanded billions of dollars for the war effort when the services couldn't see how they could use millions. Profiting by the lessons of the war, he was one who fought vigorously to expand the nation's raw material supply when the services went hog-wild in building plants to produce munitions for which they couldn't get the raw materials. The services had overruled Nathan and the men who stood with him. They had had their way with each successive, fumbling war board, right down to the weak War Production Board.

And WPB was in bad trouble again--the same old story of a struggle for power from below because none was exercised from above. The point of General Somervell's speech actually was that WPB had failed and was still failing. This was the point of many Washington developments throughout the week. And every one of the developments was a direct blow to Donald Marr Nelson, the fumbling, ineffectual WPBoss who had more power than Bernard Baruch had in World War I but who either didn't use it or didn't know how.

The week's onslaught on Nelson added up almost to an indictment. Congress was weary of the fumbling. The Senate planned soon to pass the Maloney bill, which would strip Nelson of about half his powers, those over civilian supply, and turn them over to a new agency directly under Economic Czar Jimmy Byrnes (TIME, April 26).

Nelson to the Hill. But the main attack on Nelson came from Capitol Hill, where the Truman Committee had begun to delve into the rubber and 100-octane programs. When War Under Secretary Robert P. Patterson charged that the rubber program had caused a shortage of 100-octane gasoline for planes, and thus delayed all-out bombing of Germany, the public had thought he was after the Rubber Czar, Bull Bill Jeffers. But when the Truman Committee dug, they hardly noticed Jeffers; the real quarry turned out to be Nelson.

Testimony before the committee:

> James V. Forrestal, Navy Under Secretary, charged that the overriding priority which Nelson handed Jeffers to let him bull through 55% of the synthetic rubber program had cost the Navy 100 escort vessels. It had further jammed the production of valves and other parts essential to the Navy as well as to 100-octane and Navy programs. Jeffers was not to blame; Nelson never should have granted the priority in the first place.

> Harold Ickes, Petroleum Administrator, then buttered up Jeffers but dripped bile on Nelson and WPB. The priority which Nelson should not have granted had cost 4,413,000 barrels of 100-octane, had thrown the whole gasoline program out of balance, said Ickes. WPB had permitted vital parts to be hoarded while plants lay idle for their lack. WPB's new scheduling program was not working.

> Robert P. Patterson dealt Nelson the unkindest cut. He said sweetly that he held Jeffers in "high esteem," deeply regretted if his "recent remarks should have been interpreted as reflecting" on Jeffers.

He revealed that he and Jeffers had now even planned to tour the country arm in arm, inspecting rubber and high-octane plants.

When Nelson testified that he had granted Jeffers the priority because rubber production was more important than anything else last December, his statement went almost unheard.

As far as settling the high-octane-rubber dispute went, the Truman Committee had labored in vain. But it looked as if they might have settled Don Nelson's hash.

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