Russian Warning

Moscow leveled big verbal guns at Que bec, let go a warning salvo: Aug. 12-- "The Soviet Government did not receive an invitation to be present at the [Quebec] meeting." Aug. 20 -- The Quebec conference is "serving the interests of the Anglo-American forces," but does not "express the opinion of the entire Anglo-Soviet-American coalition."

Aug. 21 -- "The Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has relieved Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Comrade Litvinoff of his post as Ambassador and Envoy Plenipotentiary of the U.S.S.R. in the United States. Comrade Andrei Gromyko has been appointed Ambassador and Envoy Plenipotentiary of the U.S.S.R. in the United States." Ever since the Soviet revolution Maxim Litvinoff has been the stoutest Russian advocate of close friendship and collaboration with Britain and the U.S. And the significance of Litvinoff's removal was not isolated: only last month Ivan Maisky, warm admirer of the British who worked long and expertly for Russian-British understanding, was removed from his post as Ambassador to Great Britain.

Parallel? Joseph Stalin certainly knew that Churchill and Roosevelt would consider the parallel with 1939: May 3 -- Maxim Litvinoff was replaced as Foreign Commissar.

June 12-- William Strang of the British Foreign Office went to Moscow to talk about joint action against aggressors.

June 29 -- Pravda published an article by M. Zhdanov, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Soviet Union.

Wrote Zhdanov: "By making play with the supposed intransigeance of the U.S.S.R.

[the British and French] can use their own public opinion to pave the way to a deal with the aggressors." Aug. 10 -- A French-British military mis sion arrived in Russia. The talks got no where. Marshal Voroshilov later said the Russians had argued that to be able to give effective aid the Red Army would have to enter Polish territory. He said the Anglo-French mission did not agree, that the Polish Government refused to accept military assistance from Russia.

Aug. 19--Russia signed a trade and credit agreement with Germany.

Aug. 23--Germany and Russia signed a nonaggression pact.

Sept. 1--World War II began.

Eastern View. Last week Red Star, official organ of the Red Army, again demanded an Allied invasion of the Continent. Red Star, said all the Wehrmacht's "attention is concentrated on operations against the Red Army, which now is bearing on its shoulders, as for two years, the main burden of the struggle against the forces of Germany."

Red Star again defined Russia's demand: "By a second front we understand an operation by our allies in the west which would draw from 50 to 60 divisions from the Soviet-German front. . . . The struggle for Sicily, however, failed to divert a single German division from the Soviet-German front."

It was not only the lack of a second front in Europe; other matters aroused Russian suspicions:

> Early in July Eduard Benes, President of Czecho-Slovakia, was going to Moscow to sign a 20-year military and political alliance with Russia. At British and perhaps U.S. prompting, he stayed in London. Alexander E. Bogomolov, Russian Ambassador to the Allied Governments in Exile in London, asked to go to Algiers to establish contact with the French Com mittee of National Liberation. The British gave him the required exit visa; U.S. authorities for more than a month refused him permission to enter Algiers. Only last week was the Ambassador allowed to proceed with his mission.

>Russia has broken relations with the Polish Government in Exile, Russia gives friendly facilities to a rival Union of Polish Patriots headquartered in Moscow. Britain and the U.S. continue relations with the Polish Exile Government in London.

Possibilities. Whatever move Soviet Russia makes, it makes no move haphazardly. There was concerted purpose in the sharp demands for a second front in Europe, in the official displeasure at being excluded from the Quebec conference, in the recall of Maisky and Litvinoff and the parallel with 1939. Joseph Stalin was saying that Russia does not necessarily have to accept the British-U.S. blueprint for war and peace; that if Russia disapproves the plans of its Western allies, if Britain and the U.S. ignore Russian demands and desires, Russia does indeed have a choice.

The Choice: Peace.

What would peace gain Russia? First & last, peace--peace to heal her wounds and grow strong again, peace while other powers weaken themselves in war, peace with the boundaries and spheres of influence Russia wants.

Would Germany want such a peace? Almost every German today must know that Germany's only way to avoid total defeat, Germany's only chance for victory, is a deal with either Britain-U.S. or with Russia. The Free German Committee sponsored by Moscow (see p. 24) wants a strong, independent, democratic-capitalistic Germany; it says Germany must have an army. So far the only British-U.S. offer to Germany is "unconditional surrender," AMGOT occupation, the threat of dismemberment. Given the choice between a super-Versailles from the west, and peace along the long eastern front, even German industrialists and militarists might accept the latter.

Probabilities. Churchill and Roosevelt might well take Russia's present attitude as designed to force them to give Russia what she wants: 1) for the war, a second front soon; 2) for the peace to come:

> Russian territories "returned to the last square inch" (including the Baltic States, that part of Poland occupied by the Red Army in 1939, Bessarabia and Bucovina, portions of Finland (see p. 26).

> A voice, equal to her power, in United Nations' councils and policies.

>No Fascist regimes in postwar Europe.

> A "strong, independent Germany." Says Stalin: "Hitlers may come and go, but the German people and the German state remain."

>Full compensation from the Axis nations for destruction in Russia. (One way of compensation: Russia may demand that certain German industries be trans planted intact to Russia.)

>No federations in Europe directed against Russian interests.

At Quebec and in Moscow, one thing was known above all else: victory might come quickly in Europe. The peace to follow could be an opportunity; it could also be a precipice. Opportunity was knocking last week.

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