Monday, Nov. 29, 1943

End on Leros

The British on Leros were desperate. Hemmed in by Germans landing from the sea, bombed and strafed by Germans commanding the air, the British defended their lonely little island in the eastern Aegean until they were slow with exhaustion. Their Italian co-belligerents fought with nontraditional bravery. A few audacious British naval craft helped a little. Long-range R.A.F. fighters helped but not enough, from their too-distant bases.

At dawn of the counterinvasion's third day the Germans crept into Alinda Bay. With the aid of paratroopers they occupied the narrow neck of land where the sea almost cuts the island in two. The British counterattacked. For a while they seemed to be gaining. So, at 4 p.m. of the fifth day, said the Leros radio, with a British upper lip. At 5 p.m. it went off the air. Leros had fallen. The defenders were captured or escaped to Samos, where the Germans shortly announced fresh attacks to root out the last British force in the Aegean. This week they claimed its capture.

Lost Wail. Leros in ancient days was the place where the daughters of Oeneus, turned into guinea hens, wailed for their brother Meleager. Last week the wailing was loudest in London. There were un official suggestions that General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson of the Mid-East Command ought to be replaced. The General did his duty, gave an explanation which left the blame on him:

"Somehow," said Sir Henry, "it seems to be my fortune to have to bolster up lost causes." This reference to the disastrous Greek campaign of 1941 did not ease the British feeling that the Aegean operation had been lamely conceived, wretchedly supported.

Sir Henry also implied a remarkable miscalculation--the British had actually expected Italians on the key island of Rhodes to seize it for the Allies. Instead they surrendered quickly to the Germans there. Said Sir Henry: "We were unlucky in not getting Rhodes on the day of the armistice [with Italy]. So we did the next best thing--hit at the enemy's line of communications and created a diversion by occupying Cos, Leros and Samos." Sir Henry could not offer another but likely explanation: that, once again, "higher authority" had forced commanders in the field to undertake a hopeless venture.

Lost Chance. Since the Allies never really held the invaded islands, the loss was serious only because the abortive sorties had caused the Germans to look to their Balkan outworks. One possible effect was hardly mentioned: the effect on neutral Turkey. The Aegean fiasco might well slow the Turks' recent drift toward active collaboration with the Allies.

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