Counterattack

The Bolivian Affair is close to a showdown. The climax will feature high diplomacy, cold economics and a strong dash of cops-&-robbers. If it turns out well, the U.S. and 18 of the 20 "Good Neighbors" will have won a resounding victory. If it does not, the whole Good Neighbor policy in Latin America will have suffered a grave defeat.

The Challenge. Said Secretary of State Cordell Hull: "It is my information that by the consultation now in progress [among 18 American Republics] there is already taking place considerable exchange of information regarding the origin of the revolution in Bolivia. This assembling of facts should soon permit each government to reach its own conclusions. The information available here increasingly strengthens the belief that forces outside Bolivia and unfriendly to the defense of the American Republics inspired and aided the Bolivian revolution."

To diplomats, this turgid language was as clear as a Hull curse. It meant that: 1) the U.S. would not recognize the revolutionary regime of Bolivia's new President, Major Gualberto Villarroel; 2) the U.S. blamed Argentina and Nazi Germany for putting the Villarroel junta in power; 3) a hemispheric united front was being formed to smash it. An even stronger blast against both Bolivia and Argentina was scheduled for this week.

Counterrevolution? One way to deal with an unsatisfactory revolution is to arrange a counterrevolution. This week nobody could prove that the State Department was trying to do so. But it was certainly watching Bolivian moves & countermoves:

P:Jose Antonio Arze, leader of the leftist PIR (Partido de Izquierda Revolucion-ario) had arrived in Lima, Peru, from Mexico. The Bolivian Government pointedly advised him to stay out of Bolivia. This week he turned up in Bolivia.

P:The PIR, a workers' party without visible military support of its own, might find such support in General David Toro, ex-President of Bolivia (1936-37), who when last seen was dodging reporters in New York and Washington.

P:In close touch with anti-Villarroel elements are Dr. Luis Fernando Guachalla, the deposed Bolivian Government's Ambassador to the U.S., and Manuel Carrasco, former President of the Bolivian Senate.

P:One way to deal with a counterrevolution is to take its principal leaders into the existing Government. The Villarroel regime may invite Arze to join. Whether he would accept is not certain.

Out of these maneuverings might come a counterrevolutionary slate with Arze for President, General Toro for Minister of Defense. The Cabinet presumably would include "good" members from all major parties--perhaps eventually even the non-Fascists in the MNR (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario) now in power.

Any counterrevolution would involve grave diplomatic risks. Latin America might applaud for a while, but each country would always fear some similar move against itself. Perhaps the U.S. looked to other, less Machiavellian measures.

The Real Adversary. Bolivia is a small and pathetic pawn; the real protagonist is Argentina. Revolution in Bolivia would have stirred hardly a ripple if it had been solely a Bolivian affair; the U.S. has recognized other juntas, other Fascistlike regimes in Latin America. Even now the issue is not simply that Argentina's authoritarian regime stands accused of sponsoring a similar regime in Bolivia. The issue is that these regimes endanger:

1) U.S. standing in Latin America; and

2) other Governments friendly to the U.S. and the Allies.

In Argentina the Government is steadily approaching the classic Fascist state. Fortnight ago it dissolved "all political parties existing in the whole territory of the nation." Last week it tightened previous gags on the press, laying down harsh regulations for newspapers, magazines, books, radio, movies and theaters. They can publish nothing which the Government does not like, must make room for all official propaganda. Restrictions on foreign correspondents were also tightened; reliable news from Argentina will be increasingly hard to get.

Catholic religious teaching has been made compulsory in all primary and secondary schools (Argentine Fascism may well acquire a Franco-like clerical front). The campaign against "Communism" is more furious and inclusive than ever. Only one essential is still lacking--an official party to monopolize all politics. Apparently the Argentine nationalist movement (technically not a party and hence not dissolved) is being groomed for the job.

Such is the type of regime which threatens to spread to other Latin countries. Notably endangered is uneasy, inflated Chile (TIME, Jan. 10) which still fears a military revolt, backed by Argentina and possibly led by ex-President Carlos Ibanez.

Governments on the Argentine model may well be more friendly to the Axis than to the Allies. But, at most, the war is a side issue to the Latin Americans involved. Argentina's dominant Colonels, Bolivia's Majors and frustrated intellectuals personify a wave of military nationalism, Fascist in form but Latin American in its basic origins. For Latin Americans and for the U.S., the important fact is that the Argentine brand of nationalism is utterly hostile to the whole U.S. idea of hemisphere cooperation. If the Argentine influence spreads beyond Bolivia, Latin America will become a set of blocs of isolated, rigidly individual states--and the U.S. will have few or no genuine friends among them.

Cracks in the Clique. Argentina, unlike Bolivia, is neither weak nor pathetic. But her Government is not invulnerable; it has several cracks. Its President, General Pedro Ramirez, pushed into the background by the "Colonels' Clique" headed by Colonel Juan Domingo Peron, does not enjoy obscurity. Within the Clique itself, Peron has serious rivals, who resent his growing power. Most dangerous seems to be Colonel Enrique Gonzalez, Cabinet-ranking Secretary to the Presidency.

The Argentine people like to call themselves democrats, but so far they have merely laughed up their sleeves at the strutting Colonels, made no attempt to kick them out. One reason is that Argentines are so well off that nothing their Government does seems important. Their wheat, meat, linseed, wool, hides, tannic extract, and dairy products are snapped up by the United Nations at fancy prices. The figures are secret, but most of the food goes to armies in Europe and civilians in Great Britain.

Peron's actual strength is unknown; national reactions to outside pressure are always uncertain. But, a total embargo against Argentina might interrupt the happy moneymoon of prosperity, make the present regime intensely unpopular, force Peron from power--unless it infuriated the proud Argentines, turned them still further away from the U.S.

United Front? An embargo, to be effective, would have to be imposed jointly by the U.S. and Great Britain; a U.S. embargo alone would have little effect. The nub, undoubtedly discussed by Secretary Hull and British Ambassador Lord Halifax, is that the U.S. needs few Argentine products, Great Britain sorely needs them. Even a temporary loss of Argentine beef might be a real blow to the British (and to the millions of Americans now eating in Britain). Loss of Argentine hides and dairy products might also make the British hesitate, as would the probable fate of their enormous investments in Argentina. Thus the great uncertainty is: How far can or will the British go?

But it is U.S. diplomacy that is on the spot. If the U.S. State Department's information is accurate, its judgment sound, its tactics skillful, it may remove a menace to the peace of the hemisphere. If not--and its reputation in such matters is not established--the U.S. will be in real trouble in Latin America.

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