Ocean No Man's Land

The incredible was true. The second ring of defenses in Japan's Pacific empire was soft.

U.S. admirals had expected to find in the famed landlocked waters of Truk a big piece of the strongest oriental navy since the Turks got licked by Venice & Co. at Lepanto in 1571. Instead the warships found by the Navy's bombers at Truk would scarcely have made a small task force.

Said Navy Secretary Knox: "Our general information was that Truk was one of the strongest bases of the enemy. They withdrew [the fleet] from Truk, there's no doubt about it." And in his opinion "they" made a mistake. "Truk," said ever-ready Frank Knox, "was the place to fight."

But beyond denying Truk the defense to which it was entitled, the Japs didn't seem to want to fight at Saipan, Tinian, Guam--bastions far to the northwest of Truk. Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's carrier forces hit these bases and Truk within the space of five days (see col. 3), probably without returning to base to refuel or rearm.*

Jap naval forces could not have been taken by surprise. There had been plenty of warning that a U.S. force was less than 1,000 miles away.

What was the explanation for Japan's sudden shrinking in the western Pacific? Where was the Jap fleet?

"Rise or Fall." Premier General Hideki Tojo (also boss of Japan's Army) told his Cabinet last week: "The Empire is literally standing at the crossroads of a rise or fall."

Japan's situation was indeed critical. In her desperation she had apparently written off nearly 3,000,000 square miles (size of the U.S.: 3,026,789 sq. mi.) of the western Pacific--the area roughly of the mandated Caroline and Marianas Islands, which she had once counted upon as the outer defenses of her empire.

But because Japan had withdrawn her fleet from the defense of the western Pacific area, it did not follow that the mandated islands would promptly fall. Each garrison on each isolated isle would undoubtedly fight bitterly.

The 3,000,000 square miles of ocean had become a vast No Man's Land. Before the might of the U.S. Navy, the area had become a bad risk on which Japan could ill afford to waste further investments.

In all likelihood last week the main units of Japan's fleet were based along the Jap lifeline which stretches from the homeland to The Netherlands East Indies, a line which passes through Palau and Yap, strong bases 470 and 750 miles off the coast of the Philippines. Sooner or later the U.S. would be in a position to strike at that line. It is there that the Jap fleet may make its last-ditch defense, when the U.S. fleet is 4,000 miles from Pearl Harbor.

* There was scarcely time to return between strikes. Mitscher might have rearmed and refueled at sea from a "sea train" of oilers and munition carriers.

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