Answers Needed

P: Is the Second Front beingdelayed?

P: If it has been postponed, is it because the British prefer to make the air war the major effort for some months more?

P: What is the matter with the Burma campaign? Are the British hedging on a big push into Burma toward China, preferring to drive--later--at Sumatra and Singapore?

P: Has the Administration arrived at a postwar policy on Germany? A present policy on Italy? Does the U.S. favor the Badoglio-Little King Government? If not, what?

P: Has the U.S. a definite policy on the Polish frontier question? Item: Does the U.S. agree that the Curzon line is a proper line?

P: How much longer can President Roosevelt postpone giving General Charles de Gaulle substantial recognition?

P: What is the U.S. position on the Russo-Finnish peace talks?

These were only simplified samples of the vast array of crucial questions, of the highest and most delicate diplomacy, that were spread before the President last week.

News by Guessing. Out of Washington came a spate of "dope stories" almost unrivaled since Pearl Harbor. Some dope exactly contradicted other dope-- though each story came from an equally high source. Their only common quality was that of smoke--there must be fire behind them,but how fierce or how slight the flame remained to be seen.

Several high officials of several nations agreed unofficially on one main point: that the British were unenthusiastic about the Second Front. Some said that the British had wanted to wait for another year, to conquer Germany by air power (which, contrary to the general impression, only finally began to get a full try fortnight ago). Further, the British are deeply aware of the risks invasion involves. Prime Minister Churchill is supposed to have been outvoted on this point by Messrs. Roosevelt & Stalin at Teheran. He is still supposedly suggesting a delay on the invasion until air power has had a real chance.

One high source is certain that Premier Stalin wants to have another Big Three meeting--right away--at which he will ask simply and coldly: When? An equally high Washington source says: Not so; what Stalin wants is not meetings but results, viz., the invasion whose date has already been agreed upon.

There was no disagreement on one other front: all Washington felt that something was wrong in Burma. Dope had it that India's Viceroy Wavell, defeatist about a Burma campaign since earlier British defeats there, had refused to give Lord Louis Mountbatten sufficient Indian troops. This was only an informed guess, but out of Burma and Washington seeped reports that Lieut. General Joseph Stilwell was at odds with Lord Louis; and the most important White House caller last week was Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Lord Louis' Deputy Chief of Staff, who bore news from Burma. And the monsoon, annual excuse for another year of inaction, is due in May.

At this point Edward R. Stettinius Jr. began packing his bags. "Soon" now, the handsome, silver-haired U.S. Under Secretary of State will hop to London to confer with British officials. To newsmen, the President carefully explained that the new assignment was no "full-dress" diplomatic mission. Mr. Stettinius said that the trip was merely a chance to iron out a few matters between the U.S. State Department and the British Foreign Office; there were "many subjects" on which the two Allies must confer.

But timing gave the Stettinius trip significance. No high-ranking State Department official has been to London since ex-Under Secretary Sumner Welles's visit four years ago. Ed Stettinius was packing his bags at a moment of subtle and extreme tension in U.S.-British-Soviet relations.

"The Time Is Near." Fortnight ago, when Winston Churchill rose in Commons (TIME, March 6), he studiously avoided a direct look at the narrow, treacherous Channel across which the Second Front must be opened. Instead he heaped praise on the great air-power drive against the Continent, admitted that he could not promise a German defeat in 1944. Following his chief's cue, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden remarked, with a depression much commented on: "I do not in my experience remember when foreign policy was so difficult to conduct as it is now. . . ."

These remarks had stirred up unusual speculation. From Moscow, Correspondent W. H. Lawrence cabled the New York Times: "Mr. Churchill's speech was not well received here. . . . The 'Second Front' issue--which most Britons and Americans had thought finally settled at Teheran--is now being revived. . . . Some Russians feel, apparently, that there has been some delay. . . ."

Was Joseph Stalin putting on pressure? Last week, in answer to a routine message of congratulation from Franklin Roosevelt, the Soviet Premier took occasion to remind Washington of "the agreements reached at Moscow and Teheran. . . ." Said blunt Joseph Stalin: "I am strongly convinced that the time is near. . . ."

Ed Stettinius, a diplomatic freshman who is regarded by the professionals with a mixture of indulgence and envy, was moving into the toughest job of his career. After five months in the State Department, ex-Businessman Stettinius is still bustling and bright-eyed, is still convinced that foreign relations can be run like any straightforward business. For this brash attitude, he is privately referred to by his more experienced--and leisurely--subordinates as "The Boy Scout." Washington was making bets last week that the problems awaiting Mr. Stettinius in London would require all a Scoutmaster's ability--even if he were only the merest errand runner for Franklin Roosevelt.

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