Tinderbox

Quietly, New York's Senator Robert Wagner and Ohio's Robert Taft introduced a short resolution, asking that Congress reaffirm the 1922 U.S. approval of Palestine as a Jewish national homeland.

The impact of this little resolution on the Arab-speaking Near East was that of a Turkish earthquake. For one thing it came at a critical time: on March 31. Jewish immigration into Palestine (which began under the 26-year-old Balfour Declaration) will end under the British White Paper of 1939.

From Iraq's Senate and Chamber of Deputies came furious protest: [The resolution] would strengthen the efforts of Axis propagandists to persuade the Arab peoples . . . that the American Government . . . [has] no sympathy with Arab peoples. . . . Any increase in Jewish immigration into Palestine would eventually result in bloodshed."

To this, Senator Wagner stoutly replied that the right of the Jew to return to Palestine had long ago been recognized by the Arabs, had been written into international law. He added tartly: "The Congress of the U.S., which for more than a century has been able to reach its own conclusions without advice . . . from foreign nations, is fully able to reach a wise conclusion in this matter."

The protests from Iraq were followed by similar protests from the British-dominated governments of Egypt, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon. Alarmed, the U.S. military suddenly decided that the resolution was no matter for Congressional debate, but touched on high military policy.

Quietly, General George C. Marshall appeared before the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. He asked that no action be taken on the resolution at this time, warned that military operations might be endangered in the tinderbox Near East. Bolstering him were letters to the Committee from Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. At week's end, it appeared that the Senate would heed General Marshall.

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