Undersea Toll

Twenty U.S. submarines have been lost in action since Pearl Harbor.* The disappearance of four was announced within eight days ending last week--as many as were lost in all 1942. It looked as if the cost of the undersea campaign was rising. In that campaign the Pacific Fleet's submarines have hung up a record which makes Navy chests swell with pride--a record which many military men consider the finest of all the Armed Forces.

U.S. submarines have definitely sunk an astounding total of 503 Jap ships (not counting 150 others in the "guesswork" category called "probably sunk or damaged"), an average of 4 1/2 Jap ships for each of the 113 submarines that the U.S. had at the time of Pearl Harbor. As more U.S. submarines bore through to the Pacific, no Jap ship is safe from undersea attack, in harbor or at sea, alone or in convoy, near home or at the fringes of Japan's empire.

Paying Off. The results of this campaign are hard to gauge exactly, but they have begun to show. On the perimeter of her slowly diminishing empire, Japan nowadays rarely dares use freighters for supply (small barges, too shallow to torpedo, have to do most of the work).

More important, to many Navymen's thinking (including CINCPAC Admiral Chester Nimitz), is the type of ships the subs specialize in sinking: Japan's hard-pressed tankers. It may have been U.S. submarines, not U.S. battleships or carriers, that forced the Japs to pull a big segment of their fleet out of Truk--because a shortage of tankers may have prevented adequate deliveries of oil.

What Price Success? COMINCH Ernest J. King is on record as saying that the Japs are improving their antisubmarine devices, but this fact does not mean that the Japs have licked U.S. subs as the Allies have licked German U-boats. Other factors tending to increase sub losses: 1) a big increase in the number of U.S. submarines (many of them new) now operating in the Pacific; 2) shorter Jap sealanes, as the Japs are driven back, which means the Japs can provide better antisub protection; 3) apparently more & more dangerous missions undertaken by U.S. subs.

Thirty percent of the U.S. sub sinkings have been announced this year and 25% of the Jap ship torpedoings have been reported in the same period.

Dates of announcements do not always indicate relative dates of sinking, but the attrition rate on Jap ships has jumped from an average of 9.6 announced sinkings per month in 1942 to 19.9 in 1943 to 38.7 this year.

The Enemy Waits. The Navy knows less about Jap subs than the public knows about U.S. subs. Jap sub production is a mystery. So is the use of the Jap sub fleet. It has never very seriously menaced U.S. shipping. Jap subs have been used for supplying outposts in tight spots or for evacuation (e.g., Kiska). Probably the Japs use their undersea craft mostly for reconnaissance. One theory: Admiral Shimada is saving his torpedoes for the all-out battle with the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Says Chester Nimitz: "They will probably become more of a menace to us as the lines shorten. We are not finished with the Japanese submarine, by any means."

* Three others have been lost but not in action: 526 and R-12 in accidents; the Sealion destroyed to prevent capture at Cavite.

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