Monday, Apr. 24, 1944

Next: Skyrocketing

Overpowering naval and air power had wrought a sudden and massive change in the Pacific. Even conservative naval officers agreed that the U.S. was master of the Pacific.

Less than 18 months ago, when Marines in the Solomons hung by their fingernails to the first breach in the enemy's outer chain, the enemy's naval thrusts were met desperately. Now the Navy hoped for nothing better than that the Jap should come out and fight.

The talk among Navy men, no longer preoccupied with rosy dreams of inherent Anglo-Saxon superiority, was that the war in the Pacific would be fought to a finish much faster than anyone had thought possible a year ago.

This did not mean that the Battle of the Pacific had magically become a pushover. The Jap was still strong among the islands of his inner barrier. He still had naval and air power which would have to be beaten down before victory. Men would die by the thousands before American soldiers and marines set foot on the home islands of Japan. What it did mean was that the Battle of the Pacific no longer seemed the heartbreaking, long, near-impossible fight it was a year ago.

The Chief. Foremost in warning the U.S. that the Pacific war had years to run, had been Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet. By last week even King had changed his tune:

"So far, it has been impossible, for lack of Japanese cooperation, to stage a major sea battle. We are willing but the Japs do not seem to want to gamble. . . .

"So we are seeking opportunities to strike whenever we can get within range of their warships or bases.... I think you will find within the next few months . . . that we shall create more of these opportunities."

The Reasons. The chief reason the U.S. could thus strut its new-won power was that it could outbuild Japan, in ships, planes and weapons. In 28 months, while its air and naval power cut big hunks out of Japanese sea might, the U.S. Navy had grown to be the greatest sea-air force in the world.

The Navy had been tactically wise in putting its building stress on carriers. Result: Japan's air power in the Pacific islands, its most potent defense after Midway, had been canceled out. The Jap's "unsinkable aircraft carriers" had in a sense become a liability. Aboard its Pacific carriers (more than 50 at last announcement) the U.S. had enough air power to snow under the best defense the enemy could put up from any island. The weakness of the unsinkables had been found. Admiral Takahashi made reluctant admission last February: carriers could be maneuvered, the islands couldn't.

Distance and Supply. The U.S. fleet in its quick growth had wrought another effect. Distance was still an enemy, but no longer as insuperable as it had once seemed. The fleet had repair and refueling craft now in such numbers that carrier task forces and even amphibious forces could range farther than they ever did before. Newly seized harbors like the vast lagoon at Kwajalein can be used to some extent as advanced bases long before shore installations are built.

Result is that almost overnight the fleet has flung respectable base establishments deep into the Pacific. Many a naval officer is sure today that it is no longer necessary to sweep up every island base on the way to the south coast of China, the objective beyond the Philippines announced by Admiral Nimitz in February. The battered Jap base at Rabaul on New Britain could be bypassed, left to wither. So might the Jap fortress at Truk.

Next Stop. Where the Navy will next strike in force, how it will utilize the 16-20 Allied divisions now under Douglas MacArthur's command, plus unpublished others under Nimitz' command, are still questions for the Jap to answer. But that the next great strike will be more spectacular and far-reaching than any yet made, he can be pretty sure.

Last week (on the MARCH OF TIME) Major General Ross E. Rowell, commanding general of Marine Air Wings in the Pacific, gave the enemy a general idea of what it would be like. Said he:

"Our first advances in the Solomons were called island-hopping. Now such tactics are called leapfrogging. Next it will be skyrocketing."

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