Out of the Darkness

"Both in Europe and in the Pacific, long roads still lie ahead. But we are now fully entered on those roads, fortified with unity, power and experience, imbued with confidence and determined to travel far and fast to victory."

With this flourish, Admiral Ernest Joseph King this week wound up his first report of the war -- a 50,000-word document comparable to George Marshall's report on the Army (TIME, Sept. 13).

The Navy, Ernie King could now say, was in good shape, with plenty of good equipment (2,500,000 tons of combat ships already). Now he could afford to let the security bars down and tell what sad shape it had been in, early in the war.

Sunda Strait. "On Feb. 28 the [British cruiser] Exeter, the [U.S. destroyer] Pope and [British destroyer] Encounter headed for Sunda Strait and were never heard from again. On March 1 the [U.S. cruiser] Houston and [Australian cruiser] Perth and [Dutch destroyer] Evertsen headed in the same direction and except for very meager reports of an engagement in the Sunda Strait, they have not been heard from since."

Savo Island. The Battle of Savo Island, Aug. 8, had left the newly landed Marines on Guadalcanal in a precarious position. "Generally speaking, we were surprised because we lacked experience," so the Japs sank four cruisers, the Vincennes, Astoria, Quincy and Canberra (Australian), damaged the cruiser Chicago and the destroyers Ralph Talbot and Patterson.

The cruisers were under the command of British Rear Admiral Victor Alexander Charles Crutchley, but, Admiral King carefully points out, Crutchley was not present because he was attending a conference aboard the transport flagship of Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner.

"The loss of the four cruisers . . . and the subsequent loss of two aircraft carriers left us inferior in strength for several months. The Japanese did not take advantage of this opportunity to engage in a fleet battle with the balance of power on their side, probably because they did not know--and we did not let them know--how severe our losses were."

Santa Cruz. By Oct. 26, 1942, the U.S. Navy and the hard-pressed Marines who had landed on Guadalcanal on Aug. 7 were still hanging on by the skin of their teeth. The carrier Hornet was sunk, and the recently repaired Enterprise was badly damaged. The destroyer Porter was sunk. The brand-new battleship South Dakota was damaged (and her famed Captain Thomas L. Gatch wounded). The cruiser San Juan suffered "considerable" damage. "We sank no enemy vessels . . . but there were partial compensations. Two enemy carriers had been put out of action and four Japanese air groups had been cut to pieces."

Guadalcanal. Until last week the first thundering quarter hour of the naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Nov. 13-15, 1942 had not been explained in any communique: "In the first 15 minutes . . . the Gushing had been put out of action by gunfire and was dead in the water; the Laffey had been sunk, the Sterett and O'Bannon had been damaged; the Atlanta was burning, and the San Francisco and Portland had been badly holed.

"The Juneau had been forced to leave the action, and the Barton had blown up. The Helena had suffered minor damage. Only the Aaron Ward, Monssen and Fletcher remained undamaged."

The Monssen was damaged shortly thereafter and the Sterett had to retire; the Monssen, Gushing, Atlanta and Juneau later sank. But some 18 Jap ships were sunk, others routed and the Battle of Guadalcanal, "in spite of the heavy losses we sustained, was a decisive victory for us, and our position in the Southern Solomons was not threatened again seriously."

Reasons for Optimism. Admiral King's report contained the first list of ships damaged during the most critical early months of the war. But it also contained a heartening message: under extreme adversity the Navy bore up well, learned its lessons, and fought all the harder.

In many ways the King report war an apologia for Navy weakness early in the war--the Navy could not improve its equipment and techniques from World War I until 1933, because it couldn't get the money from Congress; after some money had been authorized in 1933 it started on improvements.

To critics of the Navy's tardiness in recognizing aviation, Admiral King replied with full confidence in his 50 or more carriers: "The U.S. Navy has made its aviation the standard by which all other naval aviation is judged and has contributed its full share to the advances which were to make aviation a sine qua non of modern warfare."

Admiral King sometimes lapsed into minor errors. Carl Spaatz, who has been a lieutenant general for more than a year, was characterized as "Brigadier General (now Major General)." Half the Japanese on Tarawa were claimed as victims of naval gunfire and aerial bombardment--the Marines say that almost none had been killed when they landed. Major General Albert E. Brown, who led the infantry on Attu until relieved by Major General Eugene Landrum, is called "commander of the Army Air Forces."

But Admiral King's report gave the first official history of U.S. naval activities in World War II, from Pearl Harbor and Cavite to the Marshalls and Truk.

Readers who may have their eyes opened by some of the report's frankness about U.S. weakness in earlier battles can read further, find the contrast by last Christmas day: "[We] attacked Kavieng. . . . Our task force was heavily attacked by enemy planes but received no damage."

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