Time, Place and Beginning

When the Allies crossed the Channel they risked on the first day:

>> 4,000 ships, not counting small craft.

>> Twelve battleships--as many as the entire 1940 U.S. Pacific fleet had--plus cruisers and 80 destroyers as escort (according to German reports).

>> 7,500 planes and 31,000 airmen--in indifferent flying weather--during the first eight hours.

>> Four airborne divisions and two parachute divisions -- 60,000 to 90,000 airborne troops (also according to German reports).

>> Thousands upon thousands more of troops in vulnerable landing craft.

Even if the German reports were exaggerated, the losses thus risked were immense. The Channel crossing was, unavoidably, the greatest military gamble in history. The significant fact was that in taking the gamble the U.S. and Britain had had the cold courage to make the stake as big as possible in order to improve the odds.

Place Surprise. This was not the only significant decision taken by the Allied Command. They faced the fact that it was virtually impossible to achieve surprise.

They had only one nearby point--England--where they could assemble the forces required. The forces were so huge that they could not be wholly concealed. The area where they could attack most efficiently was limited to a few hundred miles of Channel coast.

The Allies chose to attack in the most obvious area. They may and are still likely to attack elsewhere. One of these assaults may yet turn out to be the knock-out punch, but the size of the first attack this week in Normandy--on a front more than 100 miles long, from Cherbourg to Le Havre--gave the Germans good reason to believe that they had already seen the beginning of the Allies' main effort.

Time Surprise. If the Allies could not surprise the Germans about the place, they did surprise them about the exact time. Eisenhower disregarded the traditional requirement--high tide just before dawn--and compromised on the weather. Furthermore his tactical fighters had put out the eyes of the Germans: in the last few days before landing Allied rocket planes had smashed every radar station they could find on the invasion coast.

On invasion day sunrise came at 5:47 a.m. and high tide at 10:33 a.m.; the landings on the beaches were made at a compromise hour between 6 and 8:25 a.m.

The Germans were apparently caught napping. According to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, Allied Naval Commander, the Allies had expected to lose 10% of their landing craft. Instead they got through virtually intact. Closely timed bombardment by warships and planes put enough coast defense guns out of action to make landings possible in most places without heavy casualties.

In the fierce battle that was joined when Allied troops hit the beach, there was also the renewal of a historic personal conflict. General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, Cromwellian conqueror of North Africa, was in command of all the Allied ground forces. Across from him was the canny, brilliant German field marshal he had met and beaten in North Africa. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the "Old Fox," was readying his forces (under Germany's Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) to strike back again.

Norman Conquest? In picking Normandy for the first landing, the Allied Command had chosen a spot virtually in the middle of the invasion coast. Most of the first reports of landings came from German sources; the Allies did not wish to dispel the uncertainty of the enemy. But the Germans soon reported landings by sea & air all the way from Honfleur (across the Seine mouth from Le Havre) to Barfleur, near Cherbourg.

By landing on this 90-mile stretch the Allies placed two major ports, Cherbourg and Le Havre, in danger. If they extended their assaults in either direction, they would gain at least one of them. Soon Germans were reporting widening Allied attacks.

Meanwhile Allied parachutists had landed in force and fighting was going on in and around Caen, the capital of William the Conqueror before he moved to Britain. Now the British were paying a return visit.

Up the Seine valley (said the Germans) a strong force of Allied paratroopers was in bitter battle near Rouen, 40 miles inland. Did this mean that Eisenhower intended to drive down to Paris, take the capital of France and disrupt rail transportation in Western Europe? It was a nice question for German strategists to ponder, while tacticians got ready for the big fight at the beachhead.

Delayed Decision? The first Allied reports indicated restrained surprise at the relative weakness of the German defense. Obviously the Germans were biding their time, anxious not to be sucked in by a feint. Perhaps some time would pass before they were sure enough of what was coming to risk throwing all they had at the invaders. Then a crucial battle would be fought.

Meantime the Allies poured men, supplies, tanks and big guns on to the beaches. By the first nightfall they commanded, in one sector alone--by German admission --about ten miles of once fashionable beaches from Trouville to Villers-sur-Mer, including Deauville.

The Absent Ones. The delay of the German counterblow was no serious sign of German weakness on the ground, but the absence of the Luftwaffe was significant. While the landing craft were crossing and the troops disembarking, they were most vulnerable to air attack. So were the unarmed craft carrying airborne troops. Up to noon of the first day only about 50 Nazi planes were seen.

Hermann Goering told the Luftwaffe that "the invasion must be beaten off even if the Luftwaffe perishes." It missed the chance of a lifetime when it let the Allied forces cross the Channel without making a move.

Although weakened, the Luftwaffe could still muster--by Allied estimates--some 1.750 fighters and 500 bombers. Possibly Goering realized last week that the Luftwaffe can fight only one more big battle. He may have saved that effort for the German Army's great attempt to throw Montgomery back into the Channel.

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