The Politics of Relief

From somewhere in Yugoslavia last week the Committee of National Liberation broadcast a blast at the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration--the Yugoslavs had refused to accept relief because UNRRA insisted upon distributing food and supplies in Marshal Tito's territory through its own organization.

It was a typical misunderstanding. Tito's men, like nearly everybody else, were confused by existing relief arrangements. The Yugoslavs were protesting about preliminary relief proposals of the inter-Allied military authorities at Bari, had blamed them on UNRRA. But UNRRA had made no deal with Tito and could not act in Yugoslavia without Yugoslavia's invitation. It had neither personnel nor organization to undertake more than general supervision of supplies.

No sooner had the Yugoslavs explained than up popped another problem. Both London's Polish Government in Exile and the Moscow-sponsored National Committee of Liberation in Lublin made formal application for relief on behalf of Poland. At UNRRA's last meeting in Montreal a fortnight ago, delegates from the London Poles had sat unhappily silent, under strict instructions to say nothing and do nothing to rock the boat. Now a major issue was out in the open. Theoretically it was up to UNRRA's Big Three (the U.S., Britain and Russia) for settlement. Actually the final decision was up to Russia. For before UNRRA can operate in Poland or any other territory occupied by the Red Army, it must first come to terms with Moscow.

In Washington last week UNRRA's Director General Herbert H. Lehman and a special mission were waiting to fly to Moscow. For the settlement of UNRRA's future in eastern Europe and the Balkans, like many another international problem, was up to the Kremlin.

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