What P.A.C. Did

The major new force in the 1944 election was the C.I.O.'s Political Action Com mittee. For months political analysts will debate the question: how effective was P.A.C.?

Had Franklin Roosevelt lost, the question would bring an easy answer: P.A.C.

was F.D.R.'s biggest liability. With the Roosevelt victory, the answer was less simple because: 1) the victory was so decisive that no single agency or group can be said to have swung it alone; 2) many a PACster would have voted for F.D.R.

anyway; and 3) grudging Democratic professionals are unwilling to give P.A.C. too much credit, now that their own skins have been saved. There will probably never be a final answer on which all can agree.

What are the facts? Against the predictions of all experts, the campaign provoked a phenomenal and unexpected increase in registration and voting. As late as Oct. 4, Pollster George Gallup had predicted that but 39,500,000 Americans would go to the polls. The final total will be some 6,000,000 more. In this big increase, P.A.C. had a definite and, perhaps, major share. P.A.C. concentrated on war workers and migrants in industrial centers, got them well registered, then on Election Day hauled them to the polls, while P.A.C. 's women minded the voters' babies at home.

P.A.C. also brought out some Republican votes. Frightened by P.A.C. 's aggressiveness, GOPsters put on vigorous registration counterattacks of their own. But a check of P.A.C. centers of activity showed that in most cases the rural (and normally Republican) vote dropped off from 1940, while Democrats gained or nearly held their previous totals in industrial centers.

Some key spots of P.A.C. activity:

New York. Most experts had predicted a big drop in New York City's civilian registration. When the count was in, it was almost up to 1940. This was due largely to P.A.C. and its allies, the American Labor and Liberal Parties. P.A.C. and its allies then boosted F.D.R.'s city plurality above 1940--from 61.2% to 61.6%. This was enough to give F.D.R. the victory, even though Dewey got a bigger plurality upstate than Willkie (506,935-10-494,019).

Detroit. Working like beavers, P.A.C. added 100,000 to the registration rolls. Because of this, Michigan, which went Republican in 1940, was swung to Roosevelt by a narrow margin.

Missouri. P.A.C.'s vote in St. Louis was the margin that put a state (given by most pollsters to Dewey) into the Roosevelt column.

Ohio. P.A.C. failed to push Ohio into the Democratic column; it was even unable to boost F.D.R.'s Cleveland plurality to its 1940 figure of 138.000. P.A.C. had concentrated on Senator Taft. His statewide plurality was kept down to 22,000 against a weak candidate (from a high of 170,000 in 1938). But not even this was a clear-cut accomplishment for P.A.C.; Bob Taft's isolationism had definitely hurt him.

Washington. In this labor-conscious state, a well-organized P.A.C. helped boost registration. But it was largely a superorganized A. F. of L. which spearheaded the resounding Democratic sweep, ousting even popular Governor Arthur Langlie.

California. P.A.C. could take little credit for California's Democratic gains. Governor Dewey utterly failed to carry California's rural vote, as all had expected he would. P.A.C. was also weak in Denver and Oregon (where it was split by factional fights).

The important question now was P.A.C.'s future. This was mainly up to PAChief Sidney Hillman and C.I.O. brain-trusters. Two things were certain: 1) P.A.C. would not disband; 2) it would be a potent pressure group in Washington.

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