Who, When & Where?

The question of who would run the Pacific War from now on was opened wide last week. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, midway in the task of liberating the Philippines, had not even waited for the mopping-up to begin before he made a bold bid for fresh fields to conquer: "Our motto becomes 'On to Tokyo.' We are ready in this veteran and proven command when called upon."

With the securing of the Philippines, MacArthur would come to the geographical limits of his present command. As CINCSoWesPAC (Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific), he now has nothing to say about operations which might take Allied forces to China, Formosa, the Bonins, Ryukyus, Kurils or Japan itself.

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, in his role of CINCPOA (Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas), now has top command in all areas north and east of Luzon. He and MacArthur have got along well thus far. But Navy men in general have no love for MacArthur; many of them believe he has slighted their service. In a special sense, the Pacific War is and has been the Navy's war, and the Navy knows that its prestige in that war is its great claim to public and Congressional support after the peace. The Navy would shrink from any public controversy with prestige-laden Douglas MacArthur. Its policy is rather to sit tight and trust that time and events, principally on Luzon, will solve the problem.

Unfinished Business. For the Japanese, the question who was going to lead the final assault was academic; the more pressing questions were when & where?

With Luzon about to be made into a base for offensive operations, the Japs would soon have to write off their vast southern conquests as a total loss. Even if they could keep the South China Sea open for supply ships and tankers for a few more weeks, they had already lost heavily on the fuel front: aircraft from four British carriers, commanded by dashing, slashing (but nonflying) Rear Admiral Sir Philip Louis Vian, had bombed the Palembang refineries on Sumatra, cutting by an estimated 75% their high-octane-gasoline output.

The great immediate threat was from Nimitz, who could pick his way up the steppingstone islands to the mouth of Tokyo Bay. Whether Japan could be invaded before the Jap armies on the mainland of Asia had been engaged was still debatable. But the way to China did not necessarily lie through Luzon and Formosa. The Japs themselves had pointed to the possibility of a northern route through the Ryukyu Islands to the great ports around the mouth of the Yangtze River.

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