Three to One

One of the bitter pills compounded in secret at Yalta was taken from the bottle and chucked publicly into the ash heap. Five days after Franklin Roosevelt had said that the U.S. would demand three votes in the assembly and support Russia's claim to a like number, the President had changed his mind--the U.S. would ask for only one vote after all.

The announcement was made by Secretary of State Stettinius, who did not say when, where or why the President made his second decision. But one reason for the quick veering of U.S. policy was plain to see. The deal did not look good to the U.S. people, nor to some of the U.S. delegates. For discarding it, Franklin Roosevelt got a minimum of criticism for indecisiveness, a substantial measure of praise for knowing when to beat a retreat.

But Ed Stettinius made it clear that the U.S. was still bound to support the Russian demand for three votes "if made." Perhaps the Russians, too, had changed their mind. If so, they did not say so. At any rate, the whole question would be put to an open vote at San Francisco.

Forebodings. Thus at least one of the events that had contributed heavily to foreboding over the San Francisco meeting was resolved, so far as it could be resolved in Washington. But some big and thorny problems remained:

P: Eight weeks after Yalta, no known progress had yet been made on the Polish question. But Ed Stettinius stoutly hoped for and predicted a solution within the next fortnight!

P: Chastened by the row over the secret voting deal, Secretary Stettinius now let it be known that there had been one other big topic at Yalta not mentioned in the communique: the question of trusteeship of colonies and liberated areas. On this there would probably be a wide split of opinion among U.S. citizens, as there was certain to be between the U.S. on one side and Britain and France on the other. The U.S. Navy, for one, made its position clear last week (see Postwar). All Ed Stettinius would say was that there would be a Big Five discussion of the matter.

P: Another ticklish problem was the San Francisco agenda. Would the conference merely be asked to swallow Dumbarton Oaks whole, without any change? Moscow's War and the Working Class, which often reflects official opinion, thought so. Yet among the U.S. delegation were at least two--Senator Arthur Vandenberg and Commander Harold Stassen--determined to amend Dumbarton Oaks. Ed Stettinius finally made the Administration line clear: to defend and preserve the basic character of Dumbarton Oaks, but to put proffered amendments before the entire conference.

It was a busy week for sanguine Ed Stettinius. He held two press conferences, issued two statements, twice addressed the Council on Foreign Relations (in Chicago and Manhattan), and spoke at a testimonial meeting for New York's Congressman Sol Bloom, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and delegate to the conference. His two most frequent phrases of the week: "Sorry, no comment on that," and "Nothing has happened to shake my belief that. . . ."

If San Francisco could be made a success by energy and assurance, Ed Stettinius would make it the biggest thing since the angels gathered to throw out Lucifer.

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