So Sorry, Mr. Sato

At 3 p.m. on a cold and sleety day last ' week, Japanese Ambassador Naotake Sato entered the Foreign Commissariat in Mos cow. He had been summoned by Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov, who had some Jap-shaking news :

"The neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was signed April 13, 1941 . . . Since that time the situation is entirely altered. Germany attacked the Soviet Union, and Japan, an ally of Ger many, helped the latter in her war against the U.S.S.R. Besides, Japan is fighting against the United States and Great Brit ain, who are allies of the Soviet Union.

"Under these circumstances the neutrality pact . . . has lost its sense. . . . The Soviet Government declares to the Japanese Government its wish to denounce the pact of April 13, 1941."

Ambassador Sato promised to let his Government know. Then, in the words of a later Tokyo broadcast, "the Ambassador retreated from the Commissariat."

What Next? Molotov's note was neither a declaration of war nor, necessarily, of intent to go to war. Legally, the treaty still had a year to run after the notice of cancellation. But the Foreign Commissar's tone suggested that this technicality might be brushed aside at Russia's convenience.

Most Britons and Americans assumed that Russia was as good as in the Pacific war, and generally liked the idea. Allied military staffs had already taken the possible and probable effects into account. Many London and Washington officials were sure that Russia was coming in --maybe soon.

At Yalta, Stalin for the first time dis cussed Pacific and Asiatic affairs with Roosevelt and Churchill. In the cozy glow of the Crimea, the Big Three presumably were not abashed by the change. But there was plenty of room for embarrassment.

The embarrassing fact is that the U.S. and British governments would just as soon finish off the Japs without Russia's valuable but hardly indispensable help. Their reason is that the peace in Asia would be a lot easier to make and maintain if Russia were not at the Pacific peace table. Actually, of course, Russia would have her say in an Asiatic peace anyhow. Now, whether she goes to the lengths of actual war with Japan or not, Russia will have a direct and powerful hand in the shaping of that peace. The U.S., Britain and their Asiatic ally, China, must face the real probabilities.

History v. Honor. In Cairo, in December 1943, just before they first met Stalin at Teheran, Roosevelt and Churchill gave their national word of honor to 1) return Manchuria to China, 2) make Korea a free and independent country.

Both promises run counter to Russia's interest and history in Asia since the 17th Century. China's historic right to Manchuria is unquestionable; Russia's historic urge toward both Manchuria and Korea is inescapable. At the least, Russia will almost certainly demand economic (which also means political) priority in Manchuria; at the most, outright possession. In either case, Russia would then be the great Asiatic and Pacific power, in a position to dominate China as well.

Conflicts of interest and method in Europe had strained Big Three relations from the start. In the end, the deepest conflict, the determining test of those relations, and of the postwar security system founded on them, may come not in Europe but in Asia.

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