In History

At 10:04 one morning last week big, bluff Senator Alben Barkley rose in the caucus room of the Senate Office Building and rapped for order. Spectators filled the hall to the corners. Senator Barkley asked for absolute quiet; the acoustics are notoriously bad. The Congressional commit tee's investigation of Pearl Harbor had begun: in the days & weeks to follow, history would be dragged up from the dark corners, dusted off and laid out on the committee table for the world to read.

Seated with Senator Barkley were four other Senators and five Representatives. Klieg lights glared on the witness chairs. Cameramen were poised for action; there were seats for 100 reporters.

In the front row of spectators sat two men with a special interest in the proceedings: big, heavy, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, in a grey business suit, and lean, bronzed Lieut. General Walter C. Short, also in grey. Their careers were al ready wrecked. Now other men would feel the stab of fact as well as the bludgeon of political innuendoes.

"Exhibit 1." In the first few days, the most interesting evidence came not from the witnesses, but from a 253-page printed booklet introduced as "Exhibit 1." This was a complete dossier of coded Japanese messages intercepted by U.S.

Army and Navy Intelligence between July 1, 1941 and Pearl Harbor Day. It showed conclusively, if further proof were needed, that official Washington was intimately aware, long before Dec. 7, 1941, of the warlike intentions of the Jap Government. It also showed that matters were coming to a climax in Japan by the end of November and that a deadline for war had been set.

On Nov. 22, Tokyo had cabled to Ambassador Nomura and Special Ambassador Kurusu: "There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th. . . . This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.. . ."

Testimony developed at the hearing, from captured Jap documents, indicated that the attack on Pearl Harbor was conceived by Admiral Yamamoto as far back as January 1941. The actual date for the attack (Dec. 8, Japanese time) had been fixed by Nov. 7.

"Miss Kimiko." How far things had gone was illustrated by a telephone conversation on Nov. 27 between Kurusu and Kumaicho Yamamoto, head of the American section of the Jap Foreign Office. The two men used a voice code in which "Miss Umeko" referred to Secretary Hull and "Miss Kimiko" to President Roosevelt. The term "matrimonial question" meant the negotiations in Washington, and talk of childbirth meant that a crisis was at hand. All this was clear to the U.S. agents who had tapped the Japs' wires; the U.S., in peace as well as war, had all the Jap signal codes. This was what the agents heard:

Yamamoto: How did the matrimonial question go today?

Kurusu: There wasn't much that was different from what Miss Umeko said yesterday. . . . Does it seem as if a child will be born?

Yamamoto (in a very definite tone): Yes, the birth of the child seems imminent. It seems as if it will be a strong, healthy boy. . . . Did you make any statement to the newspapers regarding your talk with Miss Kimiko today?

Kurusu: No, nothing. Nothing except the mere fact that we met.

Yamamoto then urged Kurusu not to break off matters pertaining to the matrimonial question.

Kurusu: Not break them? You mean talks? Oh, my!

Yamamoto: Regarding the matrimonial question. I shall send you another message.

Kurusu: But without anything--they want me to keep carrying on the matrimonial question? In the meantime we're faced with having a child born. On top of that, Tokugawa [code for the Jap Army] is champing at the bit, isn't he? . . . That's why I doubt if anything can be done.

Yamamoto: Well, we can't sell a mountain [code for: we can't yield].

Kurusu: Oh sure, I know that. ... In any event, Miss Kimiko is leaving town tomorrow and will remain in the country until Wednesday.

Yamamoto: In today's talk, there wasn't anything special then?

Kurusu: No, nothing of particular interest except that it is quite clear now that that southward--ah--the south, the south matter is having considerable effect. [This was a reference to Jap troops in French Indo-China.]

Yamamoto: I see. Well, then, goodbye.

Rupture. A day later Tokyo virtually admitted (in another code) that all negotiations were at an end: "Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts . . . but the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them [i.e., Roosevelt & Hull] that you are awaiting instructions. . . . Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but. . . ."

On Dec. 1, the messages showed, the Jap Embassy received instructions on how to destroy codes and other confidential material. On Dec. 2, Washington intercepted a message from Canton to Tokyo: "If hostilities are to begin, we here are all prepared."

Patently official Washington had known that the outbreak of war was just a matter of days. Army Intelligence even intercepted a garbled message from Tokyo to Bangkok which said: "X-Day is the 8th and the day on which the notice is to be given is the 7th."

In all the intercepted messages there were numerous references to possible points where hostilities might break out: Indo-China, Siam, new theaters in China. There were only a few slight hints that Hawaii was considered. On Nov. 29, Tokyo had cabled its consulate in Honolulu: "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements." And on Dec. 6 Honolulu cabled back to Tokyo: "The following ships were observed at anchor--nine battleships, three light cruisers, three submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were four light cruisers, two destroyers lying at docks. . . ."

Tension. Beyond the facts brought out by the intercepted messages, the first four days of the hearing developed almost nothing new. Ex-Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, who had made the first report on the disaster, snorted that nothing had so far been brought out which he did not know.

Republican Representative Bertrand W. Gearhart caused a slight flurry when he told newsmen that the cruiser Boise, en route to Manila from Pearl Harbor, had sighted a Jap task force but had not communicated its news because the skipper had been told to observe radio silence--and saw no reason for breaking the orders.

As the hearing wore on, political tension mounted. Democrats, who control the committee, let the first two witnesses--Admiral T. B. Inglis of Naval Intelligence and Colonel Bernard Thielen of the Army's General Staff--rehash old facts. Republicans, furious at the slow pace, cross-examined vigorously, but with little effect.

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