Wanted: a Decision

For the U.S. Government the hour of decision in China rapidly approached. The issue: should the U.S. openly and forcefully support the Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in its fight against the Chinese Communists? If not, how else could the traditional U.S. policy of a free, united and democratic China be maintained?

If Chiang's troops could take Manchuria without U.S. help, Washington had no problem. But Washington knew how desperately Chiang's armies needed equipment, how lack of transport virtually immobilized his main forces. The U.S. would not be content to see enemies of the Chinese Government acquire Manchuria, which can produce far more arms than all the rest of China. Control of Manchuria by Chinese Communists would constitute a major power shift in the Far East.

The issue came to a head when Generalissimo Chiang asked the U.S. to fly another Chinese army to the North. The decision was put up to Washington's powerful "Committee of Three," the heads of the State, War and Navy Departments.

Division in Washington. The Committee of Three requested the views of Lieut. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, U.S. Commander in the China Theater. Wede-meyer's response was immediate, explosive and threefold:

1) Under his present directive, he could not use U.S. forces to help the Central Government enter Manchuria, in the face of growing Communist attacks on communication lines.

2) Unless the U.S. was prepared immediately to state a strong policy in support of Chinese unification under Generalissimo Chiang, and to leave in China the forces necessary to execute this policy, it should withdraw from China.

3) If the U.S. does not implement a strong policy, Generalissimo Chiang's forces will be driven from Manchuria, and perhaps all North China, by the Communists. China will be divided in two.

This supported the stand of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. About to retire, he pulled no punches in demanding a clear-cut U.S. world policy: the place to start, McCloy said, was China. The State Department's Far Eastern Division, headed by John Carter Vincent, still wanted to go slow. They insisted that U.S. intervention would not solve China's basic problem.

Addition in Moscow. The Russian attitude toward China was obscure. At Potsdam Joseph Stalin had said: "The U.S.S.R. favors a strong, unified China. It is our belief that this objective can be accomplished only by the Central Government of Chiang Kaishek. This government is not the strongest kind of government but it is the strongest in sight in China." Nonetheless, Russian troops had managed to impede Nationalist landings at Manchurian ports and turn over some areas to the Chinese Reds.

Chungking, which three months ago was willing to pay a high price to get the Russians out, was now forced into the ironical position of asking the Red Army to hold Manchurian towns until Nationalist troops could arrive. Chungking papers reported that the Russians were willing--at a further price, which-would include coal-mining concessions and navigation rights on the Sungari river.

Russia's bargaining position had been improved by an unexpectedly weak U.S. policy. When Washington, yielding to pressure, let it be known recently that U.S. forces would be "gradually withdrawn" from China, American officers and men in the theater lost interest in their jobs, joined the clamor to pull out and leave China to civil war.

Only a clear-cut top policy decision in Washington could clean up the mess. The "Committee of Three" could not make it. Secretary Byrnes drafted a memo setting forth the conflicting State and War Department views.

The decision was up to Harry Truman.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.