Admiral v. Admiral

After 30 days of testimony and bickering, the Congressional Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee last week got back to the man in the middle of the mess. The man: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the Pacific Fleet on the fatal day.

Twangy, caustic Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner--in 1941 chief of the Navy war plans division, in 1942 the man who put the Marines ashore on Guadalcanal--put grey, heavy-jowled Admiral Kimmel at the very core of blame.

Leathery Kelly Turner is seldom assailed by doubts. He had none about Kimmel. Other admirals have testified to their doubts that war would come, their uncertainties over where the Japs might strike. Not Kelly Turner. He had thought, as early as July 1941, that war was inevitable. He not only thought that Hawaii was a "probable" target, but also that the attack would come by air.

He was just as positive that Admiral Kimmel had been prepared for "just such an attack." Admiral Turner testified that he had given him "perfectly specific and entirely clear" orders in a warning message on Nov. 27 ; nothing additional should have been necessary. If, said Admiral Turner, the Pacific commander had complied with those orders, the U.S. losses would have been materially reduced--"and there was a good chance that we could have inflicted considerable damage on the Japanese fleet." (Cracked Pennsylvania's Democratic Rep. John Murphy: "I have never seen a Monday morning quarterback who ever lost a game.")

Out of Step. Kelly Turner came in for stiff examination from Democratic members of the committee. Their point: if he, as chief of the Navy's war plans section, was so positive about war and where the blow would fall, why were all the other topmost admirals out of step with him? Admiral Turner considered himself the chief adviser of Admiral Harold R. Stark, then chief of naval operations. But "Betty" Stark, in mid-October 1941, had written to Kimmel: "I do not believe that the Japs are going to sail into us." Reminded of that letter, Kelly Turner was unperturbed. Said he: "I was very astonished when I first saw that." He also volunteered the information that Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, then head of Intelligence, had said on Dec. 6, 1941, that he did not believe Japan would attack.

Admiral Kimmel would get his chance to reply--after New Year's.

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