Turning Point?

In a Chungking office, floodlights flanked a wooden desk. One after another, in businesslike fashion, three soldiers sat down at the desk and signed a document. The three soldiers were U.S. General of the Army George C. Marshall, in blouse and pinks; Chinese Government General Chang Chih-chung, in dress uniform; Communist General Chou Enlai, in a sober blue business suit. The document, which might be a turning point in Chinese politics, was an agreement for fusion and reorganization of the Government and Communist Armies.

The agreement, reached weeks ahead of the expected date, was another triumph for patient, hard-driving Special Envoy Marshall, who had been a mainspring and balance wheel in the difficult negotiations. He called it "the great hope of China," voiced the hope "that its pages will not be soiled by small groups of irreconcilables, who for selfish purposes would defeat the Chinese . . . desire for . , . peace and prosperity."

The document blueprinted a new Go-division national army for China within 18 months. It ended the private army system, forbade the meddling of military area commanders in civilian affairs, promised the Communists, ten divisions in the new setup. Neutral U.S. professional soldiers would help both Communists and Government troops in the reorganization. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was given the power to appoint and relieve all officers, but if he felt obliged to break a Communist commander he was pledged to replace him with a candidate nominated by the senior Communist member of the Government.

The good news might be an antidote for the bad. Chinese tension was mounting over revelation of the Yalta deal, in which the U.S. and Britain had highhandedly agreed to give Russia concessions in the territory of their ally (see INTERNATIONAL). Chinese indignation was heightened by the continued failure of Soviet troops to honor their pledge and quit Manchuria. Seven high Government officials had signed a petition denouncing the Yalta pact as a "dark stain" on U.S. and British relations with China.

The Government high command tried to keep cool. The Foreign Office said that "no agreement of views" had been reached with Moscow about disposition of Manchurian industry. Meanwhile Chiang was having trouble with right-wing, anticoalition elements in the Kuomintang. Uncertainty in Manchuria had brought them into open opposition. The agreement for army unity might provoke them to a bitter last stand.

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