Beyond the Bomb

Some plans to control the atom were good, some bad. None would work in the world of 1946.

This dreadful fact was illuminated last week when the U.S. presented to the U.N. a proposal (see below) so reasonable, so technically sound that controversy over details subsided, leaving a dull, sickening realization that the best was not good enough.

International atomic control was a right and necessary objective; but it meant possession of the atom by the great, illimitably sovereign nations which were divided into two camps, each distrusting and opposing the other. The differences were deep and (in all awful probability) abiding; they were not to be blamed on the selfishness and inadequacies of politicians.

The veto which hamstrung U.N. was not a cause but a symbol of international distrust. When the U.S. promised to destroy its atomic bombs and turn over atomic secrets on condition that the Russians would not extend the precious veto to atomic control, the U.S. was dealing nobly and sensibly -- but it was dealing in superficials. At best, this new issue, the atom, could be "controlled" as well as old issues of boundaries, and ideologies, and human rights. How far the world of 1946 was from effective control of the old issues was measured by a half dozen wrecked conferences and a score of uncured sore spots. The new U.S. plan put international control of the atom at the beginning of a path -- the destination of which was not security, but "normal" diplomacy. In 1946 "normal" diplomacy had been unable to write a peace, and few had real confidence that 1946 diplomacy would be able to prevent a war, atomic or otherwise.

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