Monday, Sep. 09, 1946
Grave Decision
From Berlin, the New York Herald Tribune's Columnist Joseph Alsop reported :
"The United States has now begun a struggle for Germany against the Soviet Union. The decision to do so--one of the gravest ever made by American statesmen--was taken for two reasons. It was made necessary by the competition between the Soviet and Western systems which is now going on all over the world. It was precipitated by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov's statement to the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris on July 14, which first disclosed Soviet purposes beyond any possibility of doubt.
"The great American decision must be understood as a direct, unavoidable response to Soviet policy in Germany. From the first, this has been based on Lenin's terse but truthful dictum, 'Who controls Germany controls Europe.' . . ."
Long-range Objective. "No method has been left untried, from such propaganda devices as the macabre reopening of the State Opera to the kidnaping of courageous German socialists who have resisted being swallowed up by the Communists. No tool has been left unused, from woolly-minded American officials to former Goebbels hirelings and Nazi youth leaders. Occasionally Soviet organization has not been equal to its task, as when the collapse of Russian Army discipline in the moment of victory resulted in a vast, hideous carnival of raping and looting. But the long objective, of transforming Germany into a decisive westward extension of the Soviet system, has never been changed for an instant.
"Without mincing words, the purpose of the new American policy is to deny control of Germany, and therefore of Europe, to the Soviet Union. Statesmen on public rostrums do not of course speak so plainly. Yet that was the real motive of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes's reply to Molotov in Paris--which was to demand immediate economic unification of Germany, and to announce that the United States would make a start by uniting its zone of occupation with any or all of their zones. By this statement, Byrnes in effect invited the British to join with us in the great contest for Germany which has now been initiated.
"Curiously enough, Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin was at first dismayed. . . . Further study made the Foreign Office realize, however, that Byrnes's tactics were a remarkable blend of subtlety and realism. Therefore the economic unification of the British and American zones of occupation is now being negotiated here in Berlin, and will soon be undertaken."
Simple Tactic. "Byrnes's tactical theory was very simple. On the one hand, it was obvious there was no value in any scheme which did not assure true political and economic unification of Germany. It would actually be dangerous to enter into cumbersome and unworkable compromises which would give the illusion of unity but withhold the political and economic benefits. Far better would be frank acceptance of the division of Germany, and a firm concentration of the efforts of the Western powers on putting Western Germany on its feet. On the other hand, past experience proved that nothing but unworkable compromises could result from any ordinary negotiations with the Soviet. Therefore Byrnes decided to join the American and British zones; take all needed measures to improve the economic and political health of this region; and thus to confront the Soviets with an accomplished fact which they could take or leave as they chose."
Carrot & Stick. "Our new policy, in truth, is a policy of maximum and minimum objectives. Now that they are confronted with an accomplished fact, the Soviets are giving evidences of sore temptation to join with us and the British on terms we can agree to. This is natural, for we have both a carrot and a stick to move them. The carrot is reparations, desperately needed to supplement the war-damaged Soviet economy. The stick is the Ruhr, the greatest industrial area in Europe, which the Kremlin policy-makers deeply fear to see under the complete control of the Western powers. To secure any change of Soviet policy in Germany by these means is our maximum objective. But if the carrot and the stick do not do their job, we are at least making a start toward our minimum objective. This is to bring Western Germany back to life as a part of the Western system."
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