The Other Side of the Hump

For months the problem of U.S. relations with China has been drifting.

This week, Secretary Marshall took some action. He dispatched General Albert C. Wedemeyer to China and Korea to make "an appraisal of the overall situation."

In the cold war of peace, as in the hot war of battle, the U.S. had decided to concentrate its power first on the struggle for Europe (see WHAT PRICE PEACE?). The U.S. was not abandoning the Far East, but China, as in World War II, was relegated to a holding action.

Wedemeyer was sent to find out how China could be held. He had been wartime commander of U.S. forces in China. Like Marshall a year ago, he carried the title of special representative of the President to China, with the rank of Ambassador. Unlike Marshall, he had always opposed attempts to bring the Communists into a coalition government.

Much Need, Little Hope. Wedemeyer's mission meant no basic change in U.S. policy. There never had been any question but that Chiang Kai-shek's government should be helped. The only question was how, and on what terms. Nanking's immediate needs were higher than ever. Inflation ran unchecked, her armies were in danger of losing most of Manchuria, popular support was at a low ebb. Money was desperately needed to rebuild railroads and port facilities, to construct power plants. Nanking's own estimates of her needs ran to $2 1/2 billion.

Wedemeyer's task was to estimate the bare minimum required to keep the sick country of China alive.

There was no certainty that Congress would grant even that bare minimum. So far this year, the only aid to China which Congress had authorized was some part of the $350 million foreign relief program, which would probably be about $30 million. As in World War II, China was left with a thin trickle of supplies on the far side of a peacetime "Hump."

Trim & Adaptable. The State Department eyed a somewhat brighter spot in the Far East--the trim, adaptable, hardworking nation of Japan. Japan was under the direct and all-but-absolute control of the U.S. Strategically, it flanked the Asiatic mainland as England flanked Europe. What was more, Japan had a powerful spokesman, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

For months, MacArthur had urged an early peace treaty for Japan. Continued U.S. occupation, he argued, would serve only to alienate a potentially valuable ally.

George Marshall had decided that MacArthur was right. A fortnight ago, State quietly insisted to interested Governments that the Japanese treaty be drawn immediately. The date the U.S. wanted "was August 19, at San Francisco. MacArthur had already taken the first step toward priming the pump of Japan's economy by setting August 15 for the "opening" of Japan to 400 outside businessmen.

Japan's economy was also sick; Japan would need substantial political and economic support from the U.S. Washington had scheduled $270 million for Japanese relief in the next year, plus $600 million for U.S. occupation troops--insurance against Japan's turning to Communism. Chiang Kaishek, a onetime war ally of the U.S. and a notable opponent of Communism in China, might see some injustice in all this, but circumstances dictated policies. From the State Department point of view, the "overall situation" of China at present looked hopeless; Japan was a better proposition strategically. China's best hope was Al Wedemeyer.

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