Plan of Operations

For days the cables to Washington had borne reports of new Soviet pressure throughout Eastern Europe. Then came reports from Greece.

The Greek Government did not seem to know exactly what was happening. It reported at first that its country had been invaded by a large organized force from the north. Some of the Athens communiques sounded like war, some merely like more guerrilla fighting in Epirus. Whatever was going on, the U.S. Government made up its mind to prevent 1) a Communist overthrow of the Greek Government, or 2) establishment of a separate Communist stooge-state.

Secretary of State George Marshall hastened back to Washington from the Governors' Conference in Salt Lake City. His decision was that the U.S. must back the Truman Doctrine. A plan of operations was put into immediate effect.

The Next 30 Days. At the United Nations, the U.S. pressed hard for a border commission to keep an eye on Greece's boundaries with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the next two years. Russia, hinting it might veto, managed to delay the U.S. proposal. Washington let it be known that the 2nd Marine Division and the 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina were standing by. These two units should be enough to handle whatever forces General Markos Vafiades, the Communist guerrilla leader in northern Greece, had at his disposal.

There was, of course, always a chance--but not much of a chance--that Russia's Balkan stooge-states might go crazy with the expansionist itch and provoke a war which Russia quite certainly did not want at this time. Said a State Department official: "Russia is just as worried." Washington's intelligence reported that the Communists had assembled an international brigade near the Greek border. The U.S. hoped that when Russia saw that its bluff had been called, the brigade would melt away. The tension would last until U.S. arms for the Greek Army began to arrive in quantity--in about 30 days.

Sloth & Violence. If the U.S. plan of operations worked the independence and integrity of Greece would be saved. But the U.S., as it assumed more & more of its world responsibilities, would have to learn to operate in the wide area of political action between the extreme of isolation and the other extreme of counting up atomic bombs. London's Economist advised:

"The Americans will find no responsibility in Greece. They must take what there is with them. They will find no policy in Greece save a mixture of sloth and violence. They must create the policy. They will get little support from either side, for both are extremists. They must create their own moderates. They must expect dislike, ingratitude, and double-dealing. . . ."

A Hill with a View. Was the U.S. ready for that kind of international politics? One American who visited Athens last week found members of the U.S. military mission well-intentioned, sincere and technically able. But they cherished an awesome ignorance of the political side of their job. Said a colonel: "Conditions are quite disturbed in northern Greece. You can even get shot at--but perhaps you have heard of it." Said another officer, who is helping train the Greek Army: "I almost never read the news. It might distract me from my work."

The visiting American invited the officers to accompany him up to the Acropolis, glorious symbol of democracy's glorious start. Said a colonel: "There's nothing but some old ruins up there. But I guess that hill gives you a good view of Athens."

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