"Near War Standards"

The Mediterranean is not the most important area in the conflict between the West and Russia; it ranks after Germany (where the U.S. and Britain are gaining ground) and after China (where Communist success continues). Nevertheless, last week's big power news focused sharply on the Mediterranean; Russia's instruments were probing more & more aggressively for weaknesses in the West's position.

Sleeves Up. Italian Communists, rolling up their sleeves after a Party Congress in Milan, called strikes of workers ranging from stevedores to tax collectors. Embattled Greece was marking time--but fearful that the Greek army, victorious at Konitsa, would be unable to withstand the next guerrilla assault.

U.S. strategy recognized that in the long run defense of the Mediterranean would hinge largely on success of the European Recovery Program. However, while Congress debated ERP, Russian satellites might make military moves which would require military answers. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz said: "In the Mediterranean we would like to keep our ships as near war standards as possible."

"Just the Mediterranean?" he was asked.

"Yes."

Asked to elaborate, Nimitz said: "The Mediterranean is a very important area for us. Wherever the United States has forces ashore, those forces are entitled to have visible evidence of support."

This line of thought had led Washington to some tangible decisions. Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, one of the top U.S. strategists, last week was named to command the Navy's Mediterranean force, which began training exercises off southwestern Greece. The State Department seriously considered shifting Walter Bedell Smith from his job as Ambassador to Moscow to take overall charge of U.S. political, economic and military interests in the eastern Mediterranean area. The Navy announced that it was sending four modern submarines to Turkey. A thousand Marines sailed for the Mediterranean aboard the Navy's Montague and Bexar, both equipped for landing operations. The Marines took with them full combat equipment, including tanks, artillery, jeeps, trucks and flamethrowers. Speculation bubbled: where would the Marines land? Best guess was that they would not; that they would remain afloat, ready to take in hand small crises which might develop anywhere from Palestine to Genoa.

A Bet Down. What if the crisis turned out to be much too large for the 1,000 Marines and such other forces as the U.S. had in the Mediterranean? If the Greek army started to lose, for instance, something more than 1,000 Marines would be required to hold the line which the U.S.--and the U.N.--had drawn at the Greek border. And what if Russia or one of her satellites took steps leading to general war? Washington was betting against that chance. The Truman Doctrine, the ERP, and last week's moves in the Mediterranean were all based firmly on the assumption that Russia did not want to go to war--now; that she would not go to war until and unless she had made major strategic gains in the Cold War.

It was to prevent such gains that the U.S. sent men and ships to the Mediterranean. Reluctantly, Washington faced the possibility that it might have to send more.

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