Solomon at Key West

With the air of a man whose patience has run out, Defense Secretary Forrestal packed off to Key West last week, taking the country's Joint Chiefs of Staff* with him. "I hope to get them to come to an accommodation of views," he said. "If they don't, I shall have to make my own decisions."

Forrestal's decision to knock J.C.S. heads together and get them to agree on a general plan for the nation's defense was the climax of months of wrangling. It followed two stern warnings, the first from the Finletter Commission (TIME, Jan. 19), the second from the more recent report of the Congressional Aviation Policy Board. Said the congressional report: "Unyielding adherence to service loyalties at the expense of national security is a luxury the nation can no longer afford." To these rebukes, outspoken Carl Hinshaw, vice chairman of the congressional board, last week added another: "Our country is not getting a full dollar of effective preparedness for every dollar spent. . . ."

Whose Divisions? In the face of such complaints and, even more important, in the face of the European crisis, Secretary Forrestal knew that he had to settle two serious arguments decisively. The first concerned the future of the Marine Corps. The Army, having difficulty in filling its depleted ranks, looked with covetous eyes at the Navy's two Marine divisions (almost half of the nation's active ground strength).

The Army generals wanted the Defense Secretary to define the role of the Marine Corps, hoped it would be to Army prescription, i.e., virtually to limit the Marines to small-unit Commando work and overseas police duties. If this were done, the Marines would require units of no more than brigade strength (8,000), would probably also have to take a big cut in overall strength. The Army could go ahead on the assumption that only the Army would run off the big land operations if war should come, could thus have all the planning under one roof.

Whose Bombers? A more important question for Jim, Forrestal to decide concerned the use of strategic airpower. The Navy still thought of itself as the nation's first line of attack, refused to surrender the function of using strategic airpower--in this case, short-range bombers.

The Navy-Air Force quarrel had been brought out into the open last January, when Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz in his swan song proclaimed: "The Navy of the future will be capable of ... delivering atomic bombs from carrier-based planes." The carrier-admirals for whom he spoke saw the Navy's new bombers operating off 80,000-ton carriers (for one of which Forrestal has approved plans). From these floating airbases, they claimed, they could bomb the enemy from any point in the world. The Air Force quietly seethed.

No Time for Error. The Navy's assumption of bombing prerogatives fanned the still-smoldering embers of the unification argument into a bright new flame. The Air Force said plainly that a sinkable (and tremendously expensive) 80,000-ton carrier represented a dubious investment. Once sunk, the carrier would be a dead and irretrievable loss. The country, the airmen said, should concentrate on long-range bombers which would operate from "unsinkable" land bases. The Navy asserted that carriers are no more expensive or vulnerable than an immovable airbase.

More than a difference in concepts was involved. Both services were fighting for a larger share of the nation's now-limited defense budget. Even in a war, there would not be money and materials enough to do everything.

Until the choice was made, planning for U.S. defense would lag. At the present critical time, an error in judgment would be disastrous. Secretary Forrestal sat down with his J.C.S. to hear the services and to render judgment.

*Fleet Admiral William Leahy; General Omar Bradley and his plans chief, Lieut. General Albert Wedemeyer; General Carl Spaatz and his planner, Lieut. General Lauris Norstad; Admiral Louis Denfeld and his deputy, Vice Admiral Arthur Radford; Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, director of the J.C.S. planning staff. The three civilian secretaries, Army's Kenneth Royall, Air's Stuart Symington and Navy's John Sullivan, were left behind.

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